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"YOU'RE MY WHAT?"
THE PROBLEM OF CHILDREN'S
MISPERCEPTIONS OF THEIR LAWYERS'
ROLES
Emily Buss*
A lawyer representing seven-year-old James discussed James' op-
tions with him at considerable length. She explained to him that he
had a number of choices about where he would live, some with fam-
ily, some in foster care, and she took pains to discuss the likely con-
sequences of each of his choices. James participated actively in the
conversation, and had no trouble following the substance of the dis-
cussion. At the end of their conversation, the lawyer asked James
what option he would like her toursue. His direction to counsel:
"I think I'd like to live with you.
INTRODUCTION
A NY thinking lawyer who represents children has struggled withA-'the question of what role to assume in that representation, a
struggle that classically comes down to a choice between "best inter-
est" and "expressed interest" representation. Most of us end up pas-
sionately committed to one model of representation or another, and
try to live out that model in practice. In my practice, I have assumed
the expressed interest, or "traditional attorney" role, and have sought
to take direction from my clients about which objectives to pursue. In
soliciting their direction, I repeatedly explain to my clients that they
are in charge, that I will fight for what they want, as long as they tell
me what to fight for.
What I have found, however, is that, for many of my clients, even
the teenagers among them, the message does not sink in. They con-
tinue to assume that I will take whatever action I think is right, and
that I stand united with the public child welfare agency in controlling
their fate. For many of my clients, despite my frequent protestations
to the contrary, I am a part of the all-powerful "you all" that gives and
takes away placements, visits, and services as we see fit.
* Deputy Director, Juvenile Law Center, B.A., 1982, J.D., 1986, Yale University.
My thanks to Eleanor Bush, William Buss, Jacqueline Duby, Theresa Glennon, Kate
Greenwood, Kurt Fischer, Susan Mangold, Elaine Meyer Lee, Katherine Meyer
Reimer, Robert Schwartz, Judith Silver, Laurence Steinberg, and Merle Weiner for
their helpful comments and direction.
1. The stories in this Article are based on the actual experiences of lawyers, in-
cluding myself, who represent children, and of children who have been represented by
lawyers. Names have been changed to protect the clients' privacy.
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This role confusion plays out in a number of ways. A client may run
away from a foster care placement without ever having called me to
explain the problems he is having or to consult about his options. A
client may withhold a critical piece of information under the false im-
pression that I will support his position only if I agree with it. A child
may simply not commit the time, energy, and heartache required for
an effective client-lawyer consultation process.
At the same time, I observe the confusion running the opposite way
for clients of lawyers who have assumed the "best interest" approach.
There, too, I see children making false assumptions about their law-
yers-this time assuming that they have advocates for their expressed
positions when they do not; or assuming that information will be kept
secret by their lawyers when it will not; or assuming that their lawyers
are obligated to take action upon their 'request when they are not.
Under both of these scenarios of confusion, the role assumed is, at
best, meaningless; at worst, fraudulent. Under both scenarios, we law-
yers for children have failed to meet our most basic ethical obligations
to the children we represent.
In this Article, I will explore the issue of a lawyer's duty to commu-
nicate her role to her child client.2 I will begin, in part I, by briefly
summarizing the role debate among lawyers representing children in
dependency and custody proceedings. I will then go on, in part II, to
discuss how and why children misperceive their lawyers' roles and, in
part III, why this matters in both functional and ethical terms. My
extensive discussion of the ethical issues implicated by children's role
confusion in part III will rely heavily on an analysis of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct-the most current codification of a
lawyer's professional obligations. In part IV, I will consider children's
developing capacity for role comprehension, and finally, in part V, I
will draw on my own experience and learning theory to suggest that
children's role confusion can be reduced by ensuring their presence in
court.
I. THE UNDERLYING DisPuTE ABouT THE ROLE
OF A CHILD'S LAWYER
There is much ongoing disagreement among academics and practi-
tioners about the proper role for a lawyer to assume in representing
children in abuse and neglect and custody proceedings.3 The debate
2. For purposes of clarity, I will use feminine pronouns in referring to the generic
child's lawyer, and masculine pronouns in referring to the generic child throughout
this Article.
3. Donald N. Duquette & Sarah H. Ramsey, Representation of Children in Child
Abuse and Neglect Cases: An Empirical Look at What Constitutes Effective Represen-
tation, 20 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 341, 346-54 (1987) (noting lack of consensus about the
role and responsibilities of a child's attorney in abuse and neglect proceedings); Linda
D. Elrod, Counsel for the Child in Custody Disputes: The Time is Now, 26 Fano. L.Q.
[Vol. 641700
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generally divides people into two camps: those favoring a "traditional
attorney's" role (representing what the child client wants, or the
child's "expressed interests"),4 and those favoring a guardian ad li-
tem's ("GAL") role (representing what the lawyer determines to be in
the child's "best interest").5 There are, in addition, many who advb-
53, 57-59 (1992) (discussing the considerable confusion and disagreement about the
role a lawyer should assume in representing children in custody matters); Robyn-
Marie Lyon, Comment, Speaking for a Child: The Role of Independent Counsel for
Minors, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 681, 688-93 (1987) (noting that an absence of definitive articu-
lation of the appropriate role for a child's representative has left each attorney to
make her own decision about what role to assume); Sarah H. Ramsey, Representation
of the Child in Protection Proceedings: The Determination of Decision Making Capac-
ity, 17 Fain. L.Q. 287, 289-91 (1983) (noting the disagreement among scholars, and
lack of guidance in case and statutory law about how to represent children in child
protection proceedings); see also Ann M. Haralambie, The Child's Attorney: A
Guide to Representing Children in Custody, Adoption, and Protection Cases 2 (1993)
(discussing the lack of uniformity in state law about what it means to be appointed to
represent a child in the dependency and custody contexts).
This Article focuses on the representation of children in the dependency system
and in the related context of termination of parental rights proceedings, and includes
discussion of representation in the custody context only to the extent the same analy-
sis applies. In my view, the heart of the argument applies equally well in both con-
texts. The analysis, however, is most compelling for children in the dependency
system who generally come into the legal system from a harsher history, face worse
options at the bar of the court, are less likely to share their parents' legal interests,
and remain involved in the court process for considerably longer.
In contrast to the disagreement and confusion about the role children's attorneys
should assume in dependency and custody proceedings, the role to be assumed by
attorneys representing minors in juvenile justice proceedings (namely, the traditional
attorney role) has been clearly established and widely accepted. See Institute of Judi-
cial Administration-American Bar Association, Juvenile Justice Standards, Standards
Relating to Counsel for Private Parties Standard 3.1 (1979) [hereinafter IJA-ABA
Standards]. For a general review of the history and reasoning leading up to the adop-
tion of these standards, see the introduction to the IA-ABA Standards.
4. See, e.g., Lyon, supra note 3, at 693-94 (arguing that an attorney's duty to
advocate for her client's" wishes is no less significant when that client is a child); Wal-
lace J. Mlyniec, The Child Advocate in Private Custody Disputes: A Role in Search of
a Standard, 16 J. Farn. L. 1, 16-17 (1977-78) (arguing that following a traditional attor-
ney role "can best preserve the principles of minimal outside intervention into the
private family sphere while protecting the child's right.., to participate in legal mat-
ters affecting [his] life"); Shannan L. Wilber, Independent Counsel for Children, 27
Fain L.Q. 349, 349 (1993) (asserting that counsel should advocate the child client's
interest if the child can articulate a preference); see generally Martin Guggenheim,
The Right to Be Represented but Not Heard Reflections on Legal Representation for
Children, 59 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 76, 85-93 (1984) (endorsing child-directed representation
where child is mature enough to be "deemed to be an autonomous individual"); see
also Proposed American Bar Association Standards of Practice for Lawyers Who Rep-
resent Children in Abuse and Neglect Cases 29 Fain. L.Q. 375, § B-4 (1995) [hereinaf-
ter Proposed ABA Standards] (directing the child's attorney to advocate the child's
expressed preference unless she believes that the position would be "seriously injuri-
ous" to the child's interests).
5. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services, Final Report on the Vali-
dation and Effectiveness Study of Legal Representation Through Guardian Ad Litem,
5-2 (1995) [hereinafter HHS Study] (recommendations of Technical Expert Group
consisting of attorneys, lay advocates, judges, and academicians calling for representa-
tion of child's best interests); Brian G. Fraser, Independent Representation for the
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cate lawyers' assuming one form or another of hybrid role-somehow
representing both positions to the court, or representing what the
child wants unless the child's preference fails to meet some standard
of reasonableness, or asking the court to appoint a separate GAL or
attorney where client wishes and perceived interests divide.6 I con-
sider these hybrid models to be essentially variations on the GAL
model, because they all allow for substitution of the lawyer's judgment
for that of the client, and a communication of this substituted judg-
ment to the court. A third and smaller camp calls for the child's law-
yer to serve as a neutral fact finder presenting all relevant information
to the court to ensure a full and comprehensive consideration of the
child's actual circumstances.7 But, again, because the fact finder's de-
termination of what information is relevant to the court will inevitably
be controlled by her sense of the truth, and what should happen in the
case, and because this model focuses on the child's interests rather
than the child's preferences, I view this model as another version of
the GAL/best interest model.
Those who advocate the GAL approach argue that children lack the
maturity of judgment, even the cognitive capacity for decision making,
necessary to assess appropriately their own interests, particularly their
long-term interests.8 Even to the extent children's judgment is no
worse than that of adults, proponents of the GAL approach would
argue that society has a greater obligation to protect children from
their own bad judgments. Moreover, children are under tremendous
Abused and Neglected Child: The Guardian Ad Litem, 13 Cal. W. L. Rev. 16, 33-34
(1976) (championing GAL model whose role is to protect the needs and interests of
the child). Through the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act ("CAPTA"),
Congress has tied certain federal funding to states for child abuse and neglect pro-
grams to the provision of "GALs" in all child abuse and neglect proceedings. 42
U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(6) (1988). The role of the GAL is defined in regulations to include
"represent[ation] and protect[ion of] the rights and best interests of the child." 45
C.F.R. § 1340.14(g) (1994). Some advocates of the "best interest" model suggest that
lay volunteers, rather than attorneys, should fill the GAL role. See Rebecca H.
Heartz, Guardians Ad Litem in Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings: Clarifying the
Roles to Improve Effectiveness, 27 Fam. L.Q. 327 (1993).
6. See, e.g., Ramsey, supra note 3, at 307, 336-47 (arguing that attorneys should
represent a child's expressed interest where the child possesses the capacity to make a
decision which has a reasonable possibility of being correct; otherwise attorneys
should represent the child's best interests); Haralambie, supra note 3, at 37 (sug-
gesting that a "hybrid role may be the best framework within which to advocate for
children"); Duquette & Ramsey, supra note 3, at 352-53 (promoting the "flexible cli-
ent-centered approach to representation" used in the authors' study); Kim J. Lands-
man & Martha L. Minow, Note, Lawyering for the Child: Principles of Representation
in Custody and Visitation Disputes Arising from Divorce, 87 Yale L.J. 1126, 1186-87
(1978) (listing principles to guide attorneys in child representation combining ele-
ments of both approaches); 1-HS Study, supra note 5, at 5-24, 5-25 (reporting the
recommendation of the Technical Expert Group that the child's representative pres-
ent both positions to the court, where expressed interests and best interests diverge).
7. See, e.g., Fraser, supra note 5, at 33-34 (calling for the GAL to serve both as
fact finder and as the child's best interest advocate).
8. See Haralambie, supra note 3, at 6.
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pressure to misidentify and/or misarticulate their own interests-pres-
sure from their families, from the court process, and from the circum-
stances leading to the court process. 9 In part due to these pressures,
proponents of the GAL model contend that asking children to take
positions and make decisions about what should happen to them im-
poses too heavy a burden on them.' ° And finally, the argument goes,
the child protective system and the court process are so underfunded
and poorly conducted that, unless the child's attorney ensures that all
relevant information is presented to the judge (regardless of whether
it serves the child's expressed interests), the judge will be in no posi-
tion to make an appropriate best interest determination."
Those who advocate assuming the traditional attorney role, on the
other hand, point out that it is the judge, and not the child's lawyer,
who is responsible for determining the child's best interests. The
judge bases her decision on the evidence elicited through an adver-
9. See Stanley S. Clawar, Why Children Say What they Say, Fain. Advoc., Fall
1983, at 25, 25, 45 (stating that among other factors, children are motivated by fear,
guilt, desire to protect their parents, parental promises of change, and lack of experi-
ence with alternatives in determining what to say to lawyers, judges, and other profes-
sionals); Haralambie supra note 3, at 6 (noting that children's "wishes may be based
on threats, bribes, and other questionable bases"); Nancy W. Perry & Larry L. Teply,
Interviewing, Counseling and In-Court Examination of Children: Practical Ap-
proaches for Attorneys, 18 Creighton L. Rev. 1369, 1375-86 (1984-85) (suggesting that
children's communications with their lawyers are hampered by, among other things,
their difficulty in dealing with the emotional and social pressures connected with the
proceeding, their feelings of guilt, their difficulty understanding and framing re-
sponses to lawyers' questions, and their lack of understanding of the court process);
Ramsey, supra note 3, at 318 (observing that the emotional nature of proceedings may
interfere with children's decision-making capacity); see also Joseph Goldstein et al., In
the Best Interests of the Child 32-33 (1986) (suggesting that, because " 'children of all
ages have a natural tendency to deceive themselves about their motivations ... [and]
feelings, especially where conflicts of loyalty come into question,'" a child's lawyer
may need to seek the assistance of a child development expert to distinguish between
the child's expressed preferences and real preferences (quoting Anna Freud, On the
Difficulties of Communicating with Children, in The Family and the Law (Joseph
Goldstein & J. Katz eds., 1965))).
Children, particularly preadolescents, define their moral universe in large part by
determining what pleases the important adults in their lives. See Thomas Lickona,
Raising Good Children: From Birth Through the Teenage Years 160 (1983). In deter-
mining what is "right" to say, therefore, a child will often look to what statements will
please his parents, rather than what is objectively true, or what he might indepen-
dently want a lawyer or judge to hear. See Perry & Teply, supra, at 1374-75.
10. See Haralambie, supra note 3, at 6 (noting that the GAL role "serves to ...
buffer the child from responsibility for the decision ultimately made"); Mlyniec, supra
note 4, at 13-14 (observing that asking children to choose between parents creates
anxiety, which may, in turn, reduce the accuracy of what is said); Landsman & Minow,
supra note 6, at 1165 (asserting that "[p]sychology and moral theory both warn the
attorney not to force participation on the child" who may have good reasons for
choosing not to get directly involved in choosing between parents); see also Gary B.
Melton, Decision Making by Children: Psychological Risks and Benefits, in Children's
Competence to Consent 21, 35 (Gary B. Melton et al. eds., 1983) (stating that the
necessity of making choices can be anxiety-provoking for children).
11. See Ramsey, supra note 3, at 292.
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sarial process, and the child has a right, along with his parents and the
state, to have his position zealously advocated to the judge.12 More-
over, giving children a voice in the process that will determine their
fate empowers children, the disempowered victims of the circum-
stances (whether abuse, neglect, or parental separation) leading to the
court's involvement. 3 Lawyers who practice under the traditional at-
torney model are inspired by the considerable wisdom of children,'
4
whose judgment about their best interests often proves at least as
sound as that of the adults who have substituted their own judgment.
They also acknowledge children's power, as the subjects of the deci-
12. Guggenheim, supra note 4, at 91-92 (noting that a child old enough to engage
in meaningful decision making should be afforded the same rights as an adult to direct
counsel and to make his views known to the court); see also Ramsey, supra note 3, at
297-98 (arguing that including the child's view in the adversarial process increases the
chance of a good decision, not necessarily because the child's view is correct, but
because it requires a response from the other parties).
13. Katherine Hunt Federle, The Ethics of Empowerment: Rethinking the Role of
Lawyers in Interviewing and Counseling the Child Client, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1655,
1695 (1996) (suggesting that client empowerment should be a central value of the
lawyering role assumed); Haralambie, supra note 3, at 33 (noting that a "child may
benefit emotionally from being heard"); Mlyniec, supra note 4, at 16 (stating that by
serving as a traditional attorney, the lawyer for a child in a custody proceeding pro-
tects the child's right to participate in matters affecting his life); Ramsey, supra note 3,
at 295 (arguing that a child has an interest in being respected and included as an
autonomous individual); see also Janet A. Chaplan, Youth Perspectives on Lawyers'
Ethics: A Report of Seven Interviews 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1763, 1769 (1996) (quoting a
statement by 18-year-old Jonah who grew up in foster care that if foster children were
given more chance to make their own decisions, it would "make them feel strong
inside, feel like they can be confident").
Some scholars suggest that this emphasis on client empowerment fails to take ac-
count of the disempowering, silencing effect the legal process, and particularly legal
representation, can have on clients who are (as children are) less powerful than their
lawyers. See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning
Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 Yale L.J. 2107, 2111 (1991) (describing how client
narratives, and the messages communicated by those narratives, are displaced by
"poverty lawyers' traditional interpretive practices of marginalization, subordination,
and discipline"); Lucie E. White, Seeking " . .The Faces of otherness. .. ". A Response
to Professors Sarat, Felstiner and Cahn, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1499, 1507 (1992) (noting
that "nam[ing] the feelings of [a] less powerful other[ ] ... is also to silence her
voice"); Lucie E. White, Goldberg v. Kelly on the Paradox of Lawyering for the Poor,
56 Brook. L. Rev. 861, 861 (1990) [hereinafter White, The Paradox of Lawyering]
("Because advocacy is a practice of speaking for-of presuming and thereby prescrib-
ing the silence of the other-the advocate ... inevitably replays the drama of subordi-
nation in her own work."). These and other scholars raise important questions about
how, under the traditional attorney model, a child's lawyer can effectively give her
client her own voice in the legal proceedings. While a thorough consideration of these
questions goes beyond the scope of this Article, it is important to note that this criti-
cism of how lawyers represent less powerful clients stresses the need for greater client
direction and control. See, e.g., id at 887. Rather than arguing against the traditional
attorney model's emphasis on client control, these scholars challenge lawyers assum-
ing the traditional attorney role to be truer to this role.
14. See Ramsey, supra note 3, at 297; see also Douglas J. Besharov, Representing
Abused and Neglected Children: When Protecting Children Means Seeking the Dismis-
sal of Court Proceedings, 20 J. Fam. L. 217, 234 (1981-82) (noting that a child's view
that an abuse case against a parent should be dismissed may be the "right" decision).
[Vol. 641704
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sions being made, to prevent decisions the children oppose from being
effectively implemented.' 5 Finally, proponents of the traditional at-
torney model point to lawyers' complete lack of expertise and training
in making nonlegal best interest judgments.' 6
Few attorneys adopt an absolutist position under either model. For
most attorneys, the age of the child (and, for some, the issues at stake)
will affect which role is assumed.' 7 Those advocating the traditional
attorney approach necessarily exclude children too young to speak,
and most require that the children be old enough to engage in a ra-
tional decision-making process about the particular issue in ques-
tion.' 8 Those advocating the guardian ad litem role for most children,
generally still concede that at some age-at least in the late teenage
years-children should be able to direct their counsel, on some, if not
all, issues. 19
15. See Haralambie, supra note 3, at 32; Perry & Teply, supra note 9, at 1425 (ob-
serving that decisions made by children are more likely to be stable and long-lasting).
16. See Guggenheim, supra note 4, at 99 (commenting that "it is unlikely that the
attorney will be able to resolve effectively the often complex and value-laden issue of
what is best for the child"); see also Haralambie, supra note 3, at 6, 29 (noting that
lawyers gain no special expertise about what is in children's best interest through their
legal training or experience).
17. See Haralambie, supra note 3, at 31-32 (suggesting that the age of the child
should be a relevant factor in determining how involved the child should be in the
decision-making process); Lyon, supra note 3, at 699 (noting that child's decision-
making competency may vary with the issue); Ramsey, supra note 3, at 310 (same).
18. See, e.g., Guggenheim, supra note 4, at 93-94 (stating that a child must have,
not only the linguistic ability to direct his lawyer, but also the capacity to make con-
sidered and intelligent choices); Lyon, supra note 3, at 693 (advocating individualized
assessment of capacity by the judge, focused on whether the child can "comprehend
the circumstances of the case, the crucial issues, and the probable consequences of the
available positions on those issues"); Wilber, supra note 4, at 349 (advocating individ-
ualized assessment of capacity by the lawyer, focused on whether the particular child
is able to "articulate a reasoned preference").
Many advocates of this model draw the line at seven years of age as a crude mea-
sure of decision-making capacity. See Guggenheim, supra note 4, at 78 n.4 (suggesting
seven as a possible dividing line between those who can direct their counsel and those
who cannot); Ramsey, supra note 3, at 316, 320 (suggesting rebuttable presumption
that children seven and older have the capacity to make reasoned decisions). By
seven years of age, most children have acquired the capacity for rational thinking, or,
in Piagetian terms, have reached the stage of "concrete operations." See Jean Piaget
& Barbel Inhelder, The Psychology of the Child 92 (1969).
For children who fall below a designated age or developmental status, most lawyers
favoring the traditional attorniey model adopt some form of GAL approach. See, e.g.,
Wilber, supra note 4, at 349 (advocating "substituted judgment" approach); Lyon,
supra note 3, at 701-05 (same). But see Guggenheim, supra note 4, at 78 (calling into
question whether children who are too young to guide counsel intelligently should be
appointed counsel at all).
19. See Donald N. Duquette, Advocating for the Child in Protection Proceedings:
A Handbook for Lawyers and Court Appointed Special Advocates 32, 150 (1990)
(proposing legislation that would require lawyers representing children ages 14 and
above to advocate their expressed interests and would direct lawyers for children
under 14 to make a case-by-case determination of actual decision-making capacity);
cf. Stephen B. Billick, Developmental Competence, 14 Bull. Am. Acad. Psychiatry &
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
While both sides of the debate try to take some account of the
child's generalized capacity, they disregard how the lawyer's role is
interpreted by the individual child. Missing from the debate, and from
the discussion of the role of children's lawyers generally, is any consid-
eration of children's perceptions of their lawyers' roles, and how these
perceptions should shape the role assumed. ° Put simply, it is the the-
sis of this Article that children routinely misperceive their lawyers'
roles, and that this misperception not only makes a mockery of the
entire role debate, but also raises serious ethical problems for lawyers
representing children. In my view, it is this role confusion, as much as
anything, that distinguishes representing children from representing
adults, and that makes the ethical and coherent representation of chil-
dren so difficult.
II. CHILDREN'S MISPERCEPTIONS OF THEIR LAWYERS' ROLES
A colleague went to talk to her client at his foster home to discuss
what position she should take on his behalf at the next court hear-
ing. She explained to him that she would be seeing the judge soon,
and that she wanted to tell the judge how he felt about his place-
ment and whether he wanted to be adopted. After a lengthy discus-
sion, she said her good-byes and joined her husband, who was
waiting in the living room to give her a ride home. The client put
two and two together and asked, "Is that the judge?"
Imagine how the appointment of counsel appears through the eyes
of the child client. In many jurisdictions, children do not go to court
for their own dependency or custody cases.21 Even where they do at-
tend court regularly, they will rarely be involved in any significant way
in the decision to appoint counsel for them. A child's first introduc-
tion to his lawyer might be in his home, in a foster home, at school, or
L. 301, 306-07 (1986) (6oncluding that by age 14, children have developmental compe-
tence to take positions on their own behalf in legal proceedings, and suggesting a
sliding scale of involvement for children between the ages of seven and 14).
20. One exception is Perry and Teply's article, supra note 9, at 1376 (acknowledg-
ing children's difficulty understanding their lawyer's role, and the effect this difficulty
has on a lawyer's ability to communicate with her child clients); id. at 1378 (citing
Thomas Grisso & Thomas Lovinguth, Lawyers and Child Clients: A Call for Re-
search, in The Rights of Children: Legal and Psychological Perspectives 215, 216 (J.
Henning ed., 1982)).
21. A recent survey of children's representatives (attorneys and lay volunteers) in
23 counties throughout the United States revealed that their clients rarely spoke in
court. While the survey data does not indicate whether the children, who did not
speak, were nevertheless present, it does suggest the limited involvement these chil-
dren have in their own court proceedings. HHS Study, supra note 5, at 5-26. Cf.
National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, Resource Guidelines: Improv-
ing Court Practice in Child Abuse & Neglect Cases 33-35 (1995) [hereinafter NCJFCJ
Resource Guidelines] (listing parents, attorneys, relatives with custodial interests, and
court personnel among those "who should always be present" at court hearings; but
listing children, for most hearings, only among those "whose presence may also be
needed").
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at the offices of an involved agency. A strange adult appears (in itself
an intimidating experience for a child) and says "Hi, I'm your
lawyer. '
A lawyer is not a normal figure in a child's life. Children are famil-
iar with teachers, with doctors and nurses, and sometimes other pro-
fessionals, like social workers and therapists, who are involved in their
families' lives. But lawyers are not a part of the lexicon. None of
their friends have lawyers, at least as far as they know, nor do they
think of themselves as in need of lawyers-lawyers are for adults,
3
and particularly for those accused of crimes.2 4 Moreover, to the ex-
tent children have a sense of lawyers, through television, or through
the experience of a family member, they know that lawyers are people
who go with you to court. They don't just show up at your school.25
22. Many commentators advise children's attorneys to consult with them in a
child-friendly setting. See, e.g., Haralambie, supra note 3, at 68 (urging lawyers to take
their clients for ice cream rather than speaking to them in their offices). While these
settings may serve the important function of putting the child at ease, they will, if
anything, make it harder for the child to discern the lawyer's role. By distancing the
client from the relevant context, the ice cream-buying lawyer may make it harder for
the child to understand what else (other than treating him to ice cream) the lawyer
does on his behalf.
23. See Chaplan, supra note 13, at 1771 (discussing an interview with a child who
admitted that, when she first met her lawyer at the age of ten, she assumed the lawyer
represented her mother).
24. The child's lack of context and relevant knowledge that could be brought to
bear in interpreting the appointment of counsel in a dependency or custody proceed-
ing contrasts starkly with the information available to a child appointed counsel in the
juvenile justice system. In that system, children are much more aware of the court
process, both because they tend to be older, and because they are expected to appear
at court proceedings. Moreover, if a child is charged with a crime, and brought before
a tribunal that functions, in many respects, like an adult criminal court, see In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), counsel for the accused is a widely familiar figure whose role
is frequently reinforced in movies and on television. And, unlike children's attorneys
in custody and dependency proceedings, the attorney's role in the juvenile justice sys-
tem-that of defending the child client as zealously as if he were an adult-is well
defined and understood. See supra note 3. This is not to say that children in the
delinquency system are never confused about their lawyers' roles. In a study con-
ducted by Thomas Grisso in 1981, children were found to be roughly three times as
likely as adults to believe that their lawyer would stop advocating on their behalf if
they admitted their guilt to the lawyer. See Thomas Grisso, Juveniles' Consent in De-
linquency Proceedings, in Children's Competence to Consent 131, 143 (Gary B. Mel-
ton et al. eds., 1983).
25. Cf Perry & Teply, supra note 9, at 1375-76 (attributing children's reluctance to
communicate effectively with their lawyers, in part, to the fact that children are invol-
untary participants in the legal process). Children are not only involuntary partici-
pants in the judicial system generally, but also in their relationship with their
particular lawyer, who is assigned to them, and usually cannot be changed. This con-
trasts with adults' selection of their lawyers. Even where lawyers are appointed by
the court, adults generally can, under certain circumstances, request a different
appointment.
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Conscientious lawyers for children in the dependency and custody
context will try to allay children's confusion by explaining their role.26
But, as I will discuss in part V, learning theory suggests that children
are unlikely to learn, through verbal explanations, information that
runs counter to, or simply lacks support in, their own experience.
Moreover, the lawyer's explanation requires reference to the most
painful, private details of the child's life-abuse by a parent, place-
ment in foster care, a parent's mental health-or drug problems, or pa-
rental discord. If the child learns anything from his lawyer's
explanations, it is that the lawyer knows a lot of embarrassing things
about his family, and that she has the power to get this information
without talking to him first. This realization estranges the child from
his lawyer; it reinforces the child's perception that the lawyer operates
in an entirely different power class from the child, in pursuit of no
one's interests but her own.
To bridge this gap, the conscientious lawyer will describe what she
intends to do for the child. If the lawyer assumes the GAL role, she
will explain that she is there to help the child and to help the judge
determine what is best for the child. This limited explanation may be
comforting to some children, but it will not distinguish the lawyer's
role in any meaningful way from that of a parent, teacher, doctor, or
counselor. Without a good sense of the court process, most children
will have no idea what kind of help the GAL is providing.
To communicate the GAL role effectively, the lawyer must convey
not only a picture of the court process, but also the message that her
role in the process is to tell the judge what she thinks is best for the
child. She needs to convey that she will do this even if the child dis-
agrees with the position she is taking before the court, and even if, to
be persuasive, she must tell the judge things the child does not wish to
share.
Lawyers acting as GALs, however, understandably do not want to
begin their relationships with children by warning off their trust. In-
stead, they seek to foster a trusting relationship with general promises
of help, and silence on the details of what that help might actually
entail.27 If anything, that quest for trust and the desire to give some
26. Needless to say, if lawyers are not conscientious, the problem of role confusion
will be even worse. In its recent study, HHS found that children's representatives had
no contact with their clients in 16.4% of the cases where they represented children
ages 5-12, and in 11.5% of the cases where they represented teenagers. HHS Study,
supra note 5, at 5-6; see also Chaplan, supra note 13, at 1775-77 (discussing an inter-
view with a young adult who could not remember his dependency lawyer at all,
although he remembered, with dissatisfaction, the lawyer who represented him in the
juvenile justice system).
27. See Roy T. Stuckey, Guardians Ad Litem As Surrogate Parents: Implications
for Role Definition and Confidentiality, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1785, 1792 (1996) (noting
that it is "natural and probably necessary for guardians ad litem to encourage children
to confide in them'" but "doubtful... that many guardians ad litem warn their wards
that their secrets might be disclosed") -.
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professional shape to an otherwise shapeless role will incline the GAL
to oversell the lawyerly part of the role, suggesting that she will be the
one who "speaks for" the client in court. s
For very different reasons, the lawyer assuming the traditional law-
yer role will have at least as much difficulty communicating her role to
her client. An attorney assuming this role will explain that it is her job
to make sure that the judge knows what the child thinks about the
issues before the court, and that she will press for what the child
wants, whether or not she agrees with the child's position. To a
younger child, who has little understanding of the court system, partic-
ularly as it applies to his situation, the described lawyer-judge conver-
sation may make no sense.29 And although an older child is m a
better position to comprehend the lawyer's explanation, his greater
sophistication will also inspire a healthy skepticism: He will be likely
to disbelieve an adult professional's representation that she will cede
control to a child.
Unlike the GAL, whose role comports with children's general sense
of how adults act, the traditional attorney assumes a role that is en-
tirely foreign to the child. At least as significant, the traditional attor-
ney model requires the child, himself, to assume an unfamiliar role.30
28. Written materials discussing the best interest model demonstrate this phenom-
ena. For example, the HHS Study, supra note 5, at 5-1, 5-2,5-16, advocates the use of
a best interest model, but describes representation under this model in the following
terms: "The GAL is the child's voice in the court room, giving air to the interests and
concerns of the child and protecting the child's rights throughout the court proceed-
ings." ItL at 5-16. For another example, see the brochure produced by The National
Court Appointed Special Advocate Association (on file with Fordham Law Review),
which promotes a best interest model of lay representation under the heading "Speak
Up for a Child," and under the motto "A Child's Voice in Court."
29. The story of the child who mistook his lawyer's husband, sitting in his living
room, for the judge who would hear his case, illustrates the point.
30. Gerald P. Koocher explains that a significant part of children's socialization is
learning to do what older, bigger, and more powerful people tell them to do: "Many
children quite literally regard their rights as those entitlements that adults permit
them to exercise." Gerald P. Koocher, Children Under the Law: The Paradigm of
Consent, in Reforming the Law: Impact of Child Development Research 3. 10 (Gary
B. Melton ed., 1987) (citation omitted). In an earlier publication, Koocher wrote that
"[c]hildren are not socialized to think in terms of their own rights. Generally, they are
unlikely to perceive themselves as having decision-making authority, regardless of...
'objective reality.'" Gerald P. Koocher, Competence to Consent: Psychotherapy, in
Children's Competence to Consent 111, 112-13 (Gary B. Melton et al. eds., 1983); see
Thomas Grisso & Linda Vierling, Minors' Consent to Treatment: A Developmental
Perspective, Prof. Psychol, 412, 419 (1978) (children under the ages of 12 or 13 have
been shown to be significantly more prone to perceive the locus of control over their
lives as external, which creates a tendency to resign themselves passively to their
fate); Melton, supra note 10, at 36 (noting that a sense of autonomy is not easily
engendered in children when they have experienced very little opportunity to make
choices).
Children's perceptions of their powerlessness are likely to be exacerbated by issues
of race and class. In a study of elementary school-aged children who were given the
authority to make certain health care decisions for themselves, Charles Lewis found
that upper-middle class, white students were more likely to perceive the shift, in
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While the traditional attorney does not share the GAL's reluctance to
convey the full implications of her role to her client,3' words may not
be enough to overcome her client's incredulity.3'
Clues the child picks up in the context of his contacts with his law-
yer will add to his confusion about the traditional attorney role. Al-
ready bewildered about why and how he has a lawyer in the first
place, a child is often introduced to his lawyer (or debriefed after
speaking to his lawyer) by an adult, such as a foster mother, social
worker, therapist, or peer, who, herself, misperceives the lawyer's
role. Moreover, no matter how hard a lawyer strives to maintain the
traditional attorney-client relationship, there will be times when a
child's "childish" behavior forces the lawyer to place her authority as
a supervising adult ahead of her deference to client autonomy.33
The traditional attorney's explanation of her obligation to keep cli-
ent confidences will also be hard for a child to swallow. While all
clients-adults and children alike-may be somewhat skeptical of
their attorneys' commitment to keeping secrets,' children have a
decision-making authority than their low-income, minority counterparts, whose life
experiences may have made them less inclined to believe that professed power shifts
were, in fact, real. See Charles E. Lewis, Decision Making Related to Health: When
Could/Should Children Act Responsibly?, in Children's Competence to Consent 75,
84 (Gary B. Melton et al. eds., 1983).
Perry and Teply point out that not only do children have difficulty assuming an
"active 'client' role" (instead of remaining in the "natural 'child' role") but also their
lawyers have difficulty abandoning the "parent" role for that of counselor. Perry &
Teply supra note 9, at 1379. As a result of these two combined tendencies, children
remain passive, "listen[ing] and obey[ing] rather than retaining their independence,
viewing the attorney as one who works for them, and considering themselves as
'equals,' as would an adult." Id. (footnote omitted).
31. I have found that most (though by no means all) of my clients have welcomed
the idea of being "the boss." Moreover, as discussed in part III, below, lawyers as-
suming the traditional attorney model cannot represent their child clients effectively
absent the child's understanding of that role.
32. In my experience, children often signal their incredulity by relating to their
lawyers in a manner clearly designed to affect the lawyers' best interest judgments or
by explicitly attributing to their lawyers a best interest agenda. On occasion, a child
will more directly attempt to call the lawyer's bluff. One ten-year-old client of a col-
league, upon being told that he was my colleague's boss, told her to close her eyes
while he left the room. He also helped himself to a cup of coffee to try to provoke in
her an unlawyerly reaction.
33. On one occasion, a nine-year-old client repeatedly grabbed the steering wheel
and gear shift of my car while I was driving. While taking control of my car and
getting my client back and buckled in his seat was clearly the right choice for traffic
safety, it did not help to instill in him a sense of his decision-making authority in our
relationship.
34. See Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 Iowa L. Rev. 351, 383
(1989) (citing a study suggesting that even clients who believe that their lawyers are
obligated to keep their confidences frequently disbelieve that the obligation will be
fulifiled in practice); cf. Robert A. Burt, Conflict and Trust Between Attorney and
Client, 69 Geo. L.J. 1015 (1981) (discussing unacknowledged prevalence of distrust
between clients and their lawyers and the failure of professional standards to address
the problem).
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strong foundation in experience for their skepticism: In general, con-
fidentiality protections apply to everyone but them. The records of
their school performance, mental health evaluations, and medical ex-aminations are all routinely shared with their parents, who are free to
disseminate the information as they please.3" More specifically, chil-
dren who have told secrets to therapists, doctors, or teachers about
parental abuse and neglect have often already seen those secrets di-
vulged, first to the protective service agency (through mandatory re-
porting mechanisms) and then to the court and the very people they
"betrayed."36 Finally, their very introduction to their lawyers, who
come armed with considerable "secret" information, alerts children to
the lawyers' willingness and ability to access and divulge information
without their knowledge or consent.
Moreover, for children whose lives are entrenched in the child wel-
fare system, convincing them of the independence of their lawyer's
role-whether as a GAL or a traditional attorney-is extremely diffi-
cult. To do so, the lawyer must overcome children's assumption that
any strange adult who appears to discuss child welfare matters is just a
part of that system. I have had many clients refer to the child welfare
agency and myself as "you all," despite frequent explanations, and ac-
tions, making it clear that we had distinct roles, and that I would op-
pose the agency's action whenever so directed by my clients. In the
starkest incident of this nature, a nine-year-old client once asked me,
"When are you all going to let my mother out of jail?"
Taken together, the lack of context and relevant experience with the
dependency or custody court process and lawyers in that process, the
misinformation provided by other participants in the system, the tre-
mendous power disparity between adults and children, and the inva-
sion of privacy inherent in the lawyer's appointment and knowledge of
the case, all serve to confuse the child about the lawyer's role, particu-
larly the traditional attorney role. While the GAL's role is more com-
prehensible in that it more closely parallels other adult roles known to
children, its distinction from these other "helping adult" roles will
only be clear to the child client if he has a basic sense of the court
process and, more important, understands how "helping" plays out in
the lawyer-client context.
35. See discussion infra at notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
36. Sandra, one of the young adults interviewed by Janet Chaplan, explains:I felt that I wanted to tell my lawyer certain stuff... but I just felt that I
would get in trouble, you know. Maybe that's just being in the system...
someone [the lawyer] says "I'm not going to tell anyone" but you still have
that feeling, because your trust has been broken so much before ....
Chaplan, supra note 13, at 1771.
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Ill. THE IMPORTANCE OF CORRCr PERCEPTIONS
So why does this matter? Who cares how well a child understands
his lawyer's role, so long as the lawyer does her job?
A. Effective Representation
For attorneys assuming the traditional attorney role, there are
strong pragmatic reasons for ensuring that the child understands the
role. Without that understanding, a traditional attorney cannot effec-
tively represent her client. Unless the child client understands that his
lawyer will zealously advocate his positions, he will have no incentive
to invest the time in client-lawyer consultations necessary for good,
informed decision making, let alone the incentive to turn to his lawyer
for advice, including advice involving confidential matters. 37 And in
order to empower the child client-again, one of the objectives of this
model of representation-surely the child must understand what the
model is, for no child can be said to be empowered if he does not
know what power he has.
But for all the same pragmatic reasons, a GAL's ability to identify
and advocate a client's best interests may be enhanced by cultivating a
child's misperception that the GAL is functioning more like a tradi-
tional attorney. A child may be more candid and show a greater com-
mitment to and trust in the client-lawyer relationship if he does not
understand that the GAL may take positions opposed to those of the
child, and may use statements the child has made, or other confiden-
tial information shared, against the child's view of his interests. In-
deed, as I noted in my discussion of the causes of children's
misperceptions, the potential value to the GAL of her client's mis-
perceiving the GAL's loyalties creates a motive for encouraging that
misperception.
1. Fostering the Client-Lawyer Relationship
The role debate concerning the representation of children often
seems to rest on an assumption that "what a child wants" (and what
he knows) is a prepackaged set of information ready to be delivered
to whomever asks (so long as the asker uses age-appropriate language
in a child-friendly setting). In fact, however, the shape and size of the
37. See Grisso, supra note 24, at 142 (noting that juveniles' attitudes and expecta-
tions about their lawyers may influence the degree to which children will avail them-
selves of the protections and advice lawyers can provide); Perry & Teply, supra note 9,
at 1379 (stating that where a child fails to retain his independence in his relationship
with his lawyer, the child will not be motivated to participate, and the lawyer will
make bad, lawyer-driven decisions); see also Kurt W. Fischer & Helen H. Hand et al.,
Putting the Child Into Socialization: The Development of Social Categories in Pre-
school Children, in 5 Current Topics in Early Childhood Education 27 (Lilian G. Katz
et al. eds., 1984) (noting that "[w]ithout an understanding of social categories and
rules, children cannot act competently as members of their society").
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package delivered, not to mention how frequently and aggressively
the child will make deliveries, will be heavily influenced by the child's
perception of who is asking, and what that person intends to do with
the goods.
As with adults, a child's willingness to develop a relationship and
share information within that relationship will depend largely on his
understanding of the relationship and how the information will be
used. As adults, we develop very different and distinct relationships
with our grocer, our close friends, our therapist, and our divorce attor-
ney. Our sense of these relationships determines how much time we
spend in each, under what circumstances. Similarly, our sense of the
relationships will dictate the scope of our conversations. That we do
not share much information with the grocer, or focus only on particu-
lar family members during therapy, does not mean that we are lying to
these questioners. We are simply choosing to limit the information we
share to fit the relationship. Conversely, we may choose to be particu-
larly expansive with our divorce attorney about spousal wrongdoing,
giving details we would not even share with our close friends, in hopes
of achieving a desired outcome in a custody proceeding.
Children, too, assess their relationships when determining what
they want to say, when, and to whom about matters close to their
hearts. If a child understands nothing about his lawyer to distinguish
her from the grocer, he will be, most appropriately and understanda-
bly, reticent. He will want to put a good face on a bad situation, and
get out of the conversation as quickly as possible. If, as is common,
the child confuses his lawyer with the agency responsible for separat-
ing him from his family or sending his mother to jail, he will likely
choose to emphasize information that will change those outcomes
(such as information about the good things his mother does), or he
will focus his discussion on important matters he understands to be
within the lawyer's expertise. ("When are you all going to let my
mother out of jail?")
If the child client understands (rightly or wrongly) that his lawyer's
role is to represent his best interests as the lawyer perceives them, he
may choose to be quite strategic about when he speaks to his lawyer
and what information he shares, in an attempt to shape his lawyer's
view to fit his own view of his best interests.'8 Alternatively, he may
38. For example, teenage clients who have had considerable trouble in their living
situations or school programs often present a rosy picture of their circumstances to
their lawyers in the belief that they will increase the lawyers' commitment to gaining
them privileges (such as a less restrictive living environment or an opportunity to
participate in desired a program) if they do not mention the problems they have been
having. They choose to withhold information about their dispute with fellow resi-
dents or failing grades, not because they care, generally, about keeping the informa-
tion secret, but because they think their lawyers will judge their interests differently if
they learn this information. Neil, one of the young adults interviewed by Chaplan,
corroborates children's tendency to withhold information strategically, suggesting that
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deliberately "tell all" in the hope that his lawyer will figure out how to
rescue him from a terrible situation he has lost the power or desire to
control.39 In the absence of that desire for rescue, he may simply seek
to have as little as possible to do with his lawyer, out of a view that he
has nothing to gain from the relationship. 4°
If, on the other hand, the child understands (again, rightly or
wrongly) that the lawyer is acting in the traditional attorney role, he
may choose to be considerably more candid, and less strategic, in the
hope that the lawyer will assist him in developing a strategy, and with
the understanding that the lawyer will not use any of the information
he provides in a manner contrary to his stated interests. 41 He will be
more likely to invest time and attention in the client-lawyer relation-
ship, for he will see a connection between his investment and his de-
sired results. A child's perception of his lawyer as a powerful ally will
also inspire him to seek out his counsel for advice about important
matters as they arise, to share new information, or to raise new con-
cerns, rather than simply responding passively to his lawyer's
inquiries.
2. Keeping Secrets
An important piece of the child's assessment of context is his under-
standing of how much control he will have over information once he
shares it with his lawyer.42 Children involved in dependency and cus-
children who understand that their lawyers will report abuse and neglect will take this
information into account in deciding what to tell their lawyers. See Chaplan, supra
note 13, at 1773.
39. Jonah, also interviewed by Chaplan, suggests that when a child demonstrates
his trust in his lawyer by confiding in him about a bad situation, he is signaling that he
wants help escaping the situation. See id. at 1768-69.
40. In my observation, it is not uncommon for children to refuse to speak to their
lawyers at all. And in my own experience, I have often struggled to undo the effects
of caseworkers' berating commands to children to "talk to your lawyer, because she
came all this way, and its her job to decide what you need."
41. Several years ago, I was appointed to represent a 12-year-old girl who was
struggling with what to tell me about her long history of sexual abuse by her father.
While, clearly, part of her concern was a straightforward confidentiality concern
(would I keep what she told me a secret?), at least as big a concern was whether I
would use the information she told me to seek objectives that she favored. Her big-
gest fear was that I would use the horrifying and extensive details of her history to
argue that she should be placed in foster care where she had been badly mistreated in
the past. Only after I assured her that I would press for her placement with a school
employee (which required me to obtain a court order against the state agency's
wishes) did she agree to share the history with me.
42. Children's concerns about keeping secrets, discussed in this section, can be
distinguished from concerns about how information will be used as discussed in the
previous section. See supra section III.A.1. As stated above, children may avoid shar-
ing information, even information they do not consider secret, for fear that the lawyer
will use the information to achieve ends that they oppose. Conversely, children will
sometimes insist on keeping secrets (out of, for example, an interest in protecting the
honor, privacy, or liberty of a family member) even if they would otherwise want the
information to be used to help them. While the previous section focuses on the
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tody proceedings are often guarding many relevant secrets-secrets
about how their parents43 have behaved (Did they beat their children?
How often? Are they still drinking? Do they really use their income
for food?), how they feel about their parents (Do they trust them?
Fear them? Want to live with them? To visit them?), and why they
want what they want out of the court process (Do they want to live
with their grandmother because their mother is abusive? In hopes of
seeing their father? Because the grandmother has threatened them?).
They may also be guarding personal secrets-such as secrets about
their sexual or drug history-against discovery by their parents or the
court.
Children's reasons for keeping secrets relevant to legal proceedings
differ somewhat from adults'. Unlike adults, who tend to be con-
cerned with revealing information that might implicate themselves in
wrongdoing, children are more often concerned with keeping secrets
to protect others (such as parents). 44 This is particularly true in the
context of abuse and neglect proceedings, where the focus is on the
adults' behavior. In addition to fearing the legal consequences of the
potential revelation (such as the arrest of their parents, their place-
ment in foster care or their separation from siblings), children fear the
emotional consequences as well. They fear that they may disappoint,
anger, or lose the love of the most important people in their lives.45
While children's reasons for secrecy may differ from adults', the
value they attach to preserving their secrets is nevertheless strong.
Their willingness to speak candidly to their lawyers about the matters
in question will therefore be affected by their sense of whether secrets
will be kept.46 When a child is convinced (rightly or wrongly) that his
secrets are safe with his lawyer, he is likely to share information more
candidly, and this greater candor, in turn, will enhance his lawyer's
ability to assess the merits of his case, provide good legal advice, and
broader interest a child has in controlling the actions a lawyer takes on his behalf, this
section focuses on the more narrow interest of preventing publication of information.
As I will discuss in section III.B.l.b.i.(f), below, both of these concerns are protected
when confidentiality rules apply.
43. For the sake of simplicity, this Article refers only to parents, rather than to
other caregivers. The discussion applies equally well to any caregivers with whom the
child has a significant relationship, and whose conduct might be at issue in a depen-
dency or custody proceeding.
44. This distinction, while real, can easily be overstated. Adults, too, sometimes
keep secrets to protect others, and children, particularly in the delinquency setting,
are often guarding secrets about their own misdeeds.
45. See Clawar, supra note 9, at 25.
46. See, e.g., Chaplan, supra note 13, at 1780 (describing the view of one of the
youths interviewed that what a child tells his lawyer will be affected by whether the
lawyer will share information with others). While the connection between the law-
yer's commitment to keeping confidences and the client's willingness to share confi-
dences with his lawyer serves as the primary justification for the attorney-client
privilege and other confidentiality protections, some commentators have questioned
the strength of the connection. See infra note 85.
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advocate effectively on his behalf. On the other hand, when the child
client believes (rightly or wrongly) that his lawyer is prepared to share
his secrets at will, the child may take care to reveal only information
he is willing to share with the world at large.
A lawyer is likely to get different information from her client about
events and about the client's viewpoints depending upon the child's
perceptions of his lawyer's role. And the more fully and freely the
information flows, the better the lawyer can advocate under either
model. An attorney assuming the traditional role cannot do her job at
all if she does not get an accurate picture of what her client really
wants. Similarly, an attorney assuming the GAL role can do a better
job of assessing and advocating the child's best interests with full and
candid information from her client. If our sole focus is on lawyer ef-
fectiveness, we might advise the traditional attorney to take pains to
communicate her role, and the GAL to leave much unsaid. As I will
discuss in the next section, however, ethical principles counsel against
the GAL's concealing her role.
B. Ethical Representation
For the lawyer serving in the traditional attorney role, the interests
in accuracy and ethics merge. Unless a child client understands that
his lawyer is serving as his spokesperson in court and is duty bound to
keep client confidences,47 the child may not share the information the
lawyer needs to advocate his true wishes zealously.' Under this
model, the attorney's ethical obligation is to represent the client's true
viewpoint well and to take her direction from the client. The ethical
problem presented to the lawyer assuming the traditional role, there-
fore, is determining how to communicate her role effectively to the
client so that the client understands, and can benefit from, the
relationship.
But for the attorney serving as a GAL, the interests in accuracy and
ethics threaten to diverge. If a child client understands the GAL
role-which includes a willingness to advocate a position different
from her client's and to disclose confidences if perceived to be in the
child's interest 49-the child may seek to withhold information, or
even misrepresent information to his lawyer. Although misleading
the client into misunderstanding (or exploiting the child's misconcep-
tions of) the lawyer's role may facilitate good decision making about
and advocacy of the child's best interests by the lawyer, it raises seri-
47. For a discussion of a lawyer's confidentiality obligations under the traditional
attorney model, see infra section III.B.l.a.iii.
48, See Goldstein et al., supra note 9, at 32-33 (discussing the distinction between
"real preferences" and "expressed preferences").
49. For a discussion of a lawyer's confidentiality obligations under the GAL
model, see infra sections III.B.l.b.i.(f), llI.B.1.b.ii.(d).
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ous ethical problems. Lawyers who assume the GAL model may be
forced, therefore, to choose between honesty and effectiveness.
In my view, under either model, a lawyer is ethically compelled to
put honesty before effectiveness. As I will discuss at the end of this
part,50 a broader view of what makes a GAL effective suggests that
honesty and effectiveness will not always be in tension under this
model. But I do not premise my conclusion about what is ethically
required on this opportunity to downplay the conflict. Rather, my
conclusion is based on a conviction, borne of experience, that honesty
is the ethical minimum that we lawyers owe to other parties in our
professional relationships, particularly to those, such as children, from
whom we demand involuntary participation in those relationships.
We owe our greatest duty of honesty to those we force to act and
speak in reliance upon their perceptions of who we are.
The importance of lawyers dealing honestly with children is in no
way lessened by their diminished decision-making capacity. Indeed,
the very limits of children's understanding, and the limits on their abil-
ity to take action independent of the lawyer-client relationship, ele-
vate the importance of honest dealings and fair play within the
relationship.
In support of my thesis, I turn to the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct.5 ' The Rules reflect current consensus, 52 grounded in a long
historical tradition, on matters of legal ethics applicable to the full
range of a lawyer's professional relationships. As such, they offer a
set of principles against which to test my contention that a lawyer has
an ethical obligation to ensure that her role is understood by her child
client, regardless of which role is assumed. After a brief consideration
of the Rules' specific treatment of the representation of children, I
will go on to consider what the broader structure of the Rules tells us
about the importance of role understanding under both models of
representation.
50. See infra text accompanying notes 152-155.
51. Model Rules of Professional Conduct (1983) [hereinafter Model Rules].
52. While the Model Rules have been adopted, as of 1994, in 37 states, the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility (1981) [hereinafter Model Code] still governs
legal conduct in a significant minority of states. See 2 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W.
Wlliam Hodes, The Law of Lawyering § AP4:107, at 1269-70 (2d ed. 1990). Because
of the Model Rules' preeminence today, and the intention of the Rules' drafters to
give clearer guidance than that provided by the Model Code, my discussion of the
specific principles governing the representation of children, and the general principles
applying to all lawyers, will focus on the Rules, and will address the Code only to the
extent it suggests an additional or significantly different approach to the problems at
issue. See I U at xlvii (describing the Rules as the "new center of gravity of the law of
lawyering").
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1. Seeking Guidance from the Rules of Professional Conduct
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct do not give special atten-
tion to the representation of children,53 but rather include that repre-
sentation within their discussion of the representation of disabled
clients. Rule 1.14 directs:
When a client's ability to make adequately considered decisions in
connection with the representation is impaired, whether because of
minority, mental disability or for some other reason, the lawyer
shall, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer
relationship with the client.54
The Rule goes on to direct that an attorney should seek appointment
of a separate guardian, or take "other protective action... only when
the lawyer reasonably believes that the client cannot adequately act in
the client's own interest. '55
For attorneys seeking guidance about what role to assume in repre-
senting children, Rule 1.14 raises more questions than it answers:
What is an "adequately considered decision"? When and how is a
53. Two sets of standards more specifically addressing the representation of chil-
dren, and particularly children who are the subjects of dependency proceedings, have
also been proposed. The first of these, the IA-ABA Juvenile Justice Standards, in-
cluded a section on the representation of children in child protective proceedings,
which was never adopted. See IA-ABA Standards, supra note 3, Standard
3.1(b)(ii)[b] & [c]. The second of these standards, the Proposed American Bar Asso-
ciation Standards of Practice for Representing a Child in Abuse and Neglect Cases,
were published in Volume twenty-nine of the Family Law Quarterly and were
adopted by the ABA in February, 1996. See Proposed American Bar Association
Standards of Practice for Representing a Child in Abuse and Neglect Cases, 29 Fain.
L.Q. 375 (1995). These ABA standards focus more narrowly on the question of what
role should be assumed by the child's lawyer, but do not address the lawyer's obliga-
tion to communicate the role to the child. I will therefore focus my attention on the
Rules, which address lawyers' ethical obligations more broadly.
54. Model Rules, supra note 51, Rule 1.14(a).
55. Id. Rule 1.14(b). The Model Code addresses representation of disabled clients
in EC 7-12:
Any mental or physical condition of a client that renders him incapable of
making a considered judgment on his own behalf casts additional responsi-
bilities upon his lawyer. Where an incompetent is acting through a guardian
or other legal representative, a lawyer must look to such representative for
those decisions which are normally the prerogative of the client to make. If
a client under disability has no legal representative, his lawyer may be com-
pelled in court proceedings to make decisions on behalf of the client. If the
client is capable of understanding the matter in question or of contributing
to the advancement of his interests, regardless of whether he is legally dis-
qualified from performing certain acts, the lawyer should obtain from him all
possible aid. If the disability of a client and the lack of a legal representative
compel the lawyer to make decisions for his client, the lawyer should con-
sider all circumstances then prevailing and act with care to safeguard and
advance the interests of his client. But obviously a lawyer cannot perform
any act or make any decision which the law requires his client to perform or
make, either acting for himself if competent, or by a duly constituted repre-
sentative if legally incompetent.
Model Code, supra note 52, EC 7-12.
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child's decision-making capacity "impaired" by minority? When is a
normal client-lawyer relationship "reasonably possible"? What does
it mean for a child "adequately to act in his own interest"? How and
by whom should his interests be measured? And what is the relation-
ship between the client's ability to act in his own interest, and the
lawyer's ability to maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship?
In answering these questions, each lawyer will bring her own predi-
lections to bear-predilections about children's needs and abilities,
about the legal process, and about the lawyer's place in the process.
And it is these predilections, rather than the Rule itself, that will de-
termine what model of representation the lawyer will assume.56 A
lawyer predisposed to depart from the normal client-lawyer relation-
ship in the representation of children will conclude that the differ-
ences in children's developmental and life experience make such a
relationship impossible. A lawyer predisposed, on the other hand, to
maintain the normal client-lawyer relationship in her representation
of children will conclude that, despite some differences in children's
development and experience, the relationship can nevertheless rea-
sonably be maintained. Similarly, a lawyer predisposed to depart
from the normal client-lawyer relationship will judge a child's ability
to act in his own interest by assessing the quality of the decisions the
child makes; whereas a lawyer predisposed to maintain the normal
client-lawyer relationship will equate a child's ability to act in his own
interest with an ability to engage in the process and to articulate some
view of his own interests.
While Rule 1.14 does not tell a lawyer which role to assume, it does
suggest a framework for analyzing a lawyer's ethical duties once a role
is chosen. The Rule focuses the inquiry on the nature of the relation-
ship between the lawyer and the child, and it is from this relationship
that a lawyer's ethical obligations flow. Once the nature of the law-
yer-child relationship is identified-whether it be the relationship cre-
ated under the traditional attorney model or the GAL model-we can
turn to the full body of the Rules to determine what ethical obliga-
tions are associated with that relationship. In assessing a lawyer's eth-
ical obligation to communicate her role to her child client under each
model, I will therefore begin by examining that model's interpretation
of the relationship.
a. Ethical Obligations under the Traditional Attorney Model
i. Defining the Relationship
In essence, the assumption of the traditional attorney role reflects a
lawyer's determination that maintaining a normal client-lawyer rela-
56. See Haralambie, supra note 3, at 25-26 (concluding that because Rule 1.14
provides no real guidance to lawyers about how to represent children, lawyers are left
to establish their own subjective criteria).
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tionship is "reasonably possible" with the particular client in ques-
tion.57 While the language, "reasonably possible" suggests that there
are limits to when such a relationship should and can be maintained
(limits a GAL would construe more broadly than a traditional attor-
ney 8), the phrase also invites accommodation within those limits to
compensate for the impairment of minority. Where accommodations
can be made reasonably, Rule 1.14 directs us to make them where
needed to maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship. Paradoxi-
cally, it is the attorney's obligation to depart from her traditional ac-
tivities to the extent necessary to create and maintain the normal
relationship. While somewhat artificial, the distinction bdtween the
attorney's actions and the client-lawyer relationship is a useful one:
Lawyers can and should act very differently from the norm of lawyer-
ing where necessary to establish the normal relationship with their
clients.
This emphasis on relationships, as opposed to actions, is consistent
with the general tenor of the Rules, which call for lawyer flexibility
and responsiveness to ensure meaningful client participation in the de-
cision-making process.5 9 Read in this spirit, the phrase "as far as rea-
sonably possible" directs lawyers to make "reasonably possible"
accommodations of action to normalize the client-lawyer relation-
ship.60 So long as an accommodation can be said to enhance rather
than displace the normal client-lawyer relationship, it can and should
be embraced by a child's attorney assuming the traditional role.
57. Model Rules, supra note 51, Rule 1.14(a).
58. Under the traditional attorney model, the only circumstances under which a
normal client-lawyer relationship would be deemed to be impossible would be where
a child is entirely incapable of engaging in communication or rational decision mak-
ing. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
59. See, e.g., Model Rules, supra note 51, Rule 1.4(b) (requiring communication of
information adequate to ensure informed client decision making); 1 Hazard & Hodes,
supra note 52, § 1.4:201, at 85 (noting that the communication required by the Rules
necessarily depends on the context of representation and the parties involved); cf. Lee
A. Pizzimenti, The Lawyer's Duty to Warn Clients About Limits on Confidentiality, 39
Cath. U. L. Rev. 441, 475-76 (1990) (arguing that basing a determination about what
information should be shared with the client on an assessment of what the client
would consider relevant to his decision making rather than on a rigid means/ends
dichotomy "helps to assure that the lawyer treats her client as another human being
engaged in a cooperative endeavor... rather than simply as a means by which to
exercise her professional skill").
60. Another reading of the "reasonably possible" language would be that, rather
than requiring reasonable accommodation to maintain the normal client-lawyer rela-
tionship, it allows accommodations which depart from the normal client-lawyer rela-
tionship. This reading would suggest that the normal client-lawyer relationship
consists of a prescribed set of actions and any departure from those actions would
mark the end of what was reasonably possible within that relationship. Such a confla-
tion of conduct and relationship, however, rests on false assumptions about the mono-
lithic nature of the representation of "normal" adult clients, and is inconsistent with
the Rules' emphasis on achieving meaningful client participation.
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In representing children, lawyers automatically make some accom-
modations to establish a normal relationship with their clients: They
do not correspond with children who cannot read, for example, and
they adjust their language in an attempt to enhance children's under-
standing of the matters under discussion.6 Moreover, conscientious
lawyers make considerable efforts to put their child clients at ease (by
talking to them about sports, or walking with them to the water foun-
tain). But lawyers for children do little, if anything, to accommodate
their clients' limitations in understanding their lawyers' role. To assess
whether a client's accurate understanding of his lawyer's role is part of
a normal client-lawyer relationship and, more particularly, whether a
lawyer is ethically obligated to make every effort to facilitate her cli-
ent's understanding of that role, I turn to the full body of the Rules.
ii. Ethical Principles Applicable to the Traditional Attorney Role
One of the lawyer's core ethical duties to her client is her duty of
communication.62 The Rules place great importance on a lawyer's ob-
ligation to give her clients full and comprehensible information about
matters relating to the representation. The Preamble to the Rules calls
for lawyers to provide their clients with "informed understanding,"
and the definitional section explains that an attorney's consulting obli-
gations, which are implicated throughout the rules,63 impose a duty to
share information "sufficient to permit the client to appreciate the sig-
nificance of the matter in question."'  Most centrally, the Rules, un-
like the Model Code of Professional Responsibility that preceded
them, include a rule expressly devoted to the communication
obligation.65
The Rule governing communications breaks the obligation into two
parts. First, a lawyer has an obligation under Rule 1.4(a) to keep her
client "informed about the status of a matter" and promptly to furnish
61. In its recent study of lawyers who represent children, HHS found that a con-
siderable majority of these lawyers received some amount of training about how to
interview and communicate with children and their families. HHS Study, supra note 5,
at tbl. 4.3-5.
62. See Charles W. Wolfram, Modem Legal Ethics § 4.5, at 163-64 (1986) ("Noth-
ing lends more vitality to the client-lawyer relationship than effective communications
between lawyer and client."); 1 Hazard & Hodes, supra note 52, § 1.1:101, at 1 (listing
"communication" among four core duties owed to a client).
63. See, e.g., Model Rules, supra note 51, Rule 1.2(a), (c) (requiring consultation
over trial tactics and before limiting the objectives of representation); id. Rule 1.6(a)
(requiring consultation regarding client confidences); id Rules 1.7-1.9 (requiring con-
sultation regarding conflict of interest issues); id. Rule 2.2 (requiring consultation
before a lawyer can act as an intermediary).
64. l& pmbl.
65. Wolfram, supra note 62, § 4.5, at 164 (contrasting the Model Code's "offhand"
treatment of the communication obligation, with the Model Rules which "explicitly
require a lawyer to maintain communications with a client"); 1 Hazard & Hodes,
supra note 52, § 1.4:101, at 82 (noting that no express duty of communication exists in
the Model Code).
1996] 1721
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
requested information.66 Second, a lawyer has an obligation under
Rule 1.4(b) to "explain a matter to the extent necessary to permit the
client to make informed decisions regarding the representation. 67
The comment to Rule 1.4 further notes that communication must be
sufficient to ensure "intelligent participation" by the client.68
The comment to Rule 1.4 also expressly qualifies a lawyer's obliga-
tion to communicate where the client is disabled, noting that while the
normal standard for determining what information is to be provided is
that "appropriate for a client who is a comprehending or responsible
adult... fully informing the client according to this standard may be
impracticable ... where the client is a child or suffers from mental
disability."6 9 Presumably, this limitation merely intends to clarify that
the Rules do not bind lawyers to do the impossible, to communicate at
a level above that which their clients can comprehend.7° Far from sug-
gesting that a lawyer's communication obligations are limited to those
sufficient to educate a "comprehending and responsible adult," how-
ever, this comment, like the "reasonably possible" language of Rule
1.14, calls on lawyers to make "practicable" accommodations in the
substance of their communications to ensure that client-lawyer com-
munication is actually achieved.71 This reading is in keeping with the
spirit of Rule 1.4, which ties the effectiveness of communication, not
to any particular words or frequency of conversations, but to the
achievement of informed client decision making.72
66. Model Rules, supra note 51, Rule 1.4(a).
67. Model Rules, supra note 51, Rule 1.4(b) (emphasis added). Rule 1.4 provides
in full:
(a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a
matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information.
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to
permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.
Id Rule 1.4.
68. Id. Rule 1.4 cmt.
69. Id.
70. Clearly where, as with an infant, the client has no ability to comprehend com-
munications, the lawyer is freed from any obligation to communicate.
71. 1 Hazard & Hodes, supra note 52, § 1.4:103, at 84, explain that, "What is re-
quired to keep a client 'reasonably informed' will differ from client to client. If the
client is a child or under other disability, the burden of communication is obviously
heightened."
The comment to Rule 1.14 also makes clear that a lawyer's communication obliga-
tions are not compromised when she represents a disabled client: "Even if the person
does have a legal representative, [the comment directs] the lawyer should as far as
possible accord the represented person the status of client, particularly in maintaining
communication." Model Rules, supra note 51, Rule 1.14 cmt. (emphasis added).
72. As Wolfram explains:
The subjects covered in the consultative communication cannot be cata-
loged in advance. In part, the scope of the conversation depends on the
existing state of knowledge and sophistication of the client, the stage of the
representation at wliich the conversation occurs, the importance of the sub-
ject to the client's objectives in the case....
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Under the traditional attorney model, a lawyer's duty to communi-
cate to her child client clearly obligates her, at a minimum, to tailor
her communications to ensure that the child understands the issues at
hand so that he can make clear his views about these issues and how
they should be resolved. But, as discussed above, issue discussion
alone may not be enough to put a child in a position to understand
how the views he articulates will translate into attorney action. In-
deed, the hardest concept for the child to understand will not be that
his lawyer wants to hear his views, but that these views amount to a
direction of that lawyer's actions. Unless the lawyer's communications
also explain why and how the views expressed by the child will affect
what the lawyer does, the child cannot be said to be "participating,"
let alone intelligently.
More telling than the obligation to communicate set out in Rule 1.4
and elsewhere, which focuses on information sharing about the subject
of, rather than the nature of, the representation,73 is the assumption
upon which all the rules are built-that clients hire lawyers to do their
bidding within the limits of the law.74 Because children do not get
their lawyers in the "normal way," they do not bring to the client-
lawyer relationship an understanding of what the "normal" relation-
ship is about. Only by ensuring that a child understands what a nor-
mal client-lawyer relationship is (and how it applies to him) can a
lawyer make the normal relationship possible.
This understanding is necessary to make any of a lawyer's ethical
obligations to her client make sense in the context of representing
children. Put simply, every ethical obligation between a lawyer and
her client is premised on the concept of client control within the limits
of lawful behavior. Without a clear understanding of this premise, a
Wolfram, supra note 62, § 4.5, at 165; see also Mark Spiegel, The New Model Rules of
Professional Conduct: Lawyer-Client Decision Making and the Role of the Rules in
Strycturing the Lawyer-Client Dialogue, 1980 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 1003, 1011 (not-
ing that meaningful decision making between lawyer and client requires not just "ex-
change of paper or words going from lawyer to client" but an exchange that ensures
"participation and involvement that enable the client to genuinely understand the
decision to be made"); cf. George v. Caton, 600 P.2d 822, 827 (N.M. Ct. App.) (di-
recting that where potential client spoke in Navajo language through an interpreter,
lawyer had duty to adapt communications to address difficulties of translation), cert.
denied, 598 P.2d 215 (N.M. 1979).
73. One exception to this generalization, of course, is the communication obliga-
tion created by potential conflicts of interest. See Model Rules, supra note 51, Rules
1.7-1.9.
74. See 1 Hazard & Hodes, supra note 52, § 1.2:201, at 28 (explaining that the
lawyer is to abide by the client's lawful objectives because "realization of those objec-
tives is the very reason the lawyer was hired in the first place"); Spiegel, supra note
72, at 1003 (noting that the ideological basis of our adversary system is a "strong
commitment to client control"); see also Model Rules, supra note 51, Rule 1.2(a) ("A
lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of
representation.").
17231996]
1724 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64
child client will not and cannot take control.7' In order for a lawyer to
ensure that she can function as a traditional attorney for a child client,
and meet all of her ethical obligations flowing from that relationship,
she must first create the relationship by ensuring that the child in fact
knows to assume control.
Where the child lacks this understanding, the lawyer's representa-
tion is incoherent. At best, she may have an informed consultant, but
not an engaged decision-making client. At worst, she will have an in-
attentive subject-confused about the purpose of their conversations,
angry about being called upon to recite, once again, his private
thoughts, or simply uninvested in the client-lawyer relationship and
the judicial process.76 Moreover, unless the child understands that he
controls decision making, his lawyer can easily manipulate their dis-
cussions to glean whatever "direction" she wants from the client.77
75. Cf. Spiegel, supra note 72, at 1005 (noting that giving a lay person decision-
making authority "without placing a corresponding duty of communicating informa-
tion on the professional results in many instances in undermining the strength of the
right to make'decisions").
76. The client who asked me when I was going to let his mother out of jail, and his
older brother, both have demonstrated this mix of confusion, resentment, and lack of
investment in the lawyer-client consultative process. In part because of the slow pace
of court proceedings in their case (tangible evidence of the limits of my powers and
the powers of the court system in general), both boys, in their own ways, signaled
their uncertainty about what role I played. The older boy interpreted my questions
about his feelings about adoption, not as opportunities to control his fate (to others he
frequently expressed his desire to be adopted), but as challenges to his loyalty to his
imprisoned mother. To him, I was not someone who could help him work through
what he wanted and make it happen, but rather a strange adult who was asking him
how much he loved his mother. His brother, much less of a brooder, became neither
defensive nor sad in response to my questions. He simply shrugged, and turned to
more comfortable subjects of conversation, like sports and toys. Neither of these boys
were too young to form or articulate positions, nor were they reluctant to do so. They
jut didn't know what to do with me. I, in turn, had no clear direction about how to
represent them.
Another very different sort of example of a child's failure to invest in the lawyer-
client relationship is offered by a colleague: She represented a 17-year-old girl who
was having trouble fitting in at her group home. Despite my colleagues' efforts to
explain her role and offer her assistance, she later learned from authorities that her
client had run away. The child had not seen my colleague as a resource for improving
or changing her circumstances. As a result, my colleague was powerless to represent
her.
77. Children may, in general, be more suggestible than adults. See Perry & Teply,
supra note 9, at 1393. Such tendencies are exacerbated by a lack of understanding
about the purpose of the lawyer's questioning. Imagine if the man we thought was
our grocer turned out to be our divorce attorney. Our nods to his friendly pleasan-
tries about our family could lead to the dismissal of our divorce petition or alarming
misreadings about our view of custody issues. Similarly, a child's conversation with
his lawyer about how he likes a foster home, or school, or his mother's boyfriend, can
easily turn into a lawyer led discussion, where the child must directly contradict his
lawyer in order to take over "direction" of the representation. The lawyer will leave
the conversation convinced that the child's position is in accord with her own, when,
in fact, the child was unaware of taking any position at all. All he thought he was
doing was politely hearing the lawyer out.
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While tying the creation of the client-lawyer relationship to a cli-
ent's understanding of that relationship may feel circular, the analysis
is really quite straightforward. Client control (the basis of the tradi-
tional attorney model) demands client awareness of that control, and
therefore ethical lawyering under this model includes the obligation to
create the awareness. For the lawyer assuming the traditional attor-
ney role, the difficulty lies not in parsing the ethical duty to communi-
cate her role to her client, but in effectively gaining the client's
understanding of that role in practice.7"
iii. The Special Question of Confidentiality
To a great extent, once (and if) a child's understanding of the law-
yer's role is achieved, the application of an attorney's ethical obliga-
tions falls neatly into place as the obligations flowing from any
"normal" client-lawyer relationship. One of the most controversial
obligations, however, the obligation to keep information confidential,
bears specific consideration because of its centrality to the client-law-
yer relationship and the child's understanding of that relationship.
79
Model Rule 1.6 significantly expanded the reach of an attorney's
obligation to maintain client confidences beyond the obligation im-
posed by the Code. Unlike the Code, which limits the confidentiality
protection to information "gained in" the professional relationship
that "the client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of
Cf Id. at 1397 (suggesting that the more insecure and anxious a child is, the more
likely he will be to agree with whatever his lawyer says, particularly because "children
in our culture are taught to view adults as authority figures-persons to be obeyed
and appeased"); see also Ramsey, supra note 3, at 321 (discussing the ease with which
lawyers can manipulate clients by slanting information provided, or pressuring clients
to take certain positions); Wolfram, supra note 62, § 4.5, at 164 (observing that re-
stricting the information flow to a client can be used by lawyers to manipulate client
decision making).
78. For a modest proposal about how the client's understanding can be enhanced,
see infra part V.
79. See 1 Hazard & Hodes, supra note 52, § 1.6:105, at 155 (asserting that a law-
yer's two most fundamental duties to his client are the duties of confidentiality and
loyalty). The scope of an attorney's obligation to maintain the confidences of her
clients has been and continues to be fiercely debated. Id. § 1.6:102, at 130.2. The
confidentiality protection articulated in Model Rule 1.6, which obligates an attorney
to keep confidential all matters "relating to representation of a client" sparked the
most controversy during the drafting and adoption of the Model Rules. Id. at 127.
Interestingly, the primary objection to the confidentiality principle-that it only
protects guilty people, for the innocent have no need of its protections-doesn't apply
to children, whose darkest secrets are not about themselves, but about others, usually
their parents. Children's disregard of their own interests in determining if and when
to keep secrets has not, however, inspired support for a more expansive construction
of the confidentiality principles as applied to children. To the contrary, many lawyers
representing children have advocated for the application of a more restrictive confi-
dentiality protection to that representation out of concern that secret keeping de-
tached from self-interest may put or keep children at serious risk of harm. See Report
of the Working Group on Confidentiality, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1367, 1367-77 (1996).
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which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to
the client,"" ° Rule 1.6 prevents an attorney from disclosing any infor-
mation "relating to representation," absent the client's informed con-
sent.8 ' The confidentiality principles articulated in the Code and the
Rules are, of course, limited by other legal requirements that mandate
the disclosure of certain information.8
Where a lawyer assumes the traditional attorney role in represent-
ing a child, the duty of confidentiality that is so central to the "normal
client-lawyer relationship" surely applies.8 3 This means that, except to
the extent other laws require disclosure, everything a child tells his
lawyer about his own history of abuse or other parental misdeeds, as
well as all information gained from other sources, cannot be revealed
unless the child client has consented, after a full discussion of the
risks, to the disclosure.84
As discussed earlier, however, children generally have no reason to
expect that adults will keep their secrets. Indeed, many children have
become involved in the court system precisely because they shared
secret information about their parents' misdeeds with doctors, teach-
ers, or social workers who passed on that information to courts, other
social workers, and their parents themselves. Given this life experi-
ence, children will be slow to understand (and, more importantly, be-
lieve) this dimension of their lawyers' role. Without that
understanding, they will be disinclined to trust their lawyers enough to
share information as freely as is contemplated in the normal client-
lawyer relationship; that is, as freely as necessary to ensure high qual-
ity representation and effective client-lawyer consultation. 5
80. Model Code, supra note 52, DR 4-101(A).
81. Model Rules, supra note 51, Rule 1.6(a).
82. See 1 Hazard & Hodes, supra note 52, § 1.6:105, at 158.1 (explaining that a
lawyer cannot keep information confidential where required by "other law" to
disclose).
83. Cf., In re Maraziti, 559 A.2d 447, 450 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989) (holding
that communication between a minor and his attorney in a dependency case was enti-
tled to attorney-client privilege); see also Haralambie, supra note 3, at 35 ("Where the
attorney is appointed as legal counsel, communication should remain privileged.").
While case law focuses on the more narrow protection of the attorney-client privilege,
the analysis supporting inclusion of children within this protection is equally applica-
ble in the broader context of the confidentiality protection afforded by Rule 1.6.
84. See Wolfram, supra note 62, at 306 (noting that a lawyer is prevented by the
confidentiality obligation from revealing information gained from the client unless the
client gives knowing and intelligent consent after being warned by his lawyer of the
risks of disclosure).
85. Hazard and Hodes note that while there is "little empirical evidence of the
precise degree to which clients rely on the principle of confidentiality" in determining
what to say to their lawyers, "it is intuitively obvious that lawyers operating under a
binding requirement of confidentiality will have at least some greater ability to gain
the trust of at least some clients." 1 Hazard & Hodes, supra note 52, § 1.6:101, at 128;
see also Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (noting that the pur-
pose of the attorney-client privilege is "to encourage full and frank communication
between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in
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But the importance of a child's understanding of the confidentiality
obligation goes well beyond the traditional connection between the
client's understanding and his willingness to talk freely with his law-
yer. A child's understanding of his lawyer's duty to keep his secrets is
key to his true understanding of the lawyer's entire role. By pledging
to maintain a child client's secrets, a lawyer sends the child the most
powerful, comprehensible message about client control.
8 6
As discussed above, one of the central reasons children have such
difficulty understanding and accepting the traditional attorney's role is
that, despite what they are told, their experience tells them to disbe-
lieve and to distrust. Informing children that you, their adult attorney,
are required as part of your job to keep all their secrets will strike
them as extraordinary. In my experience, this information causes chil-
dren to sit up and take notice in a way that the time-worn "I'm here to
help you," or "to tell the judge what you want" never will. This is, in
part, because a pledge of secrecy is unusually comprehensible to a
child. Unlike general discussions of client control, the specifics of the
confidentiality obligation can easily be put into language, a child can
understand.8 7 Children understand the concept of keeping secrets
very well, and the concept of a lawyer "getting in trouble" if she tells
the observance of law and administration of justice"). But see Zacharias, supra note
34, at 352-56 (discussing a study of lawyers and laymen that suggests that there is
some link between confidentiality protection and the use of and candor with lawyers,
but that the link is not as strong as might be expected); Comment, Functional Overlap
Between the Lawyer and Other Professionals: Its Implications for the Privileged Com-
munications Doctrine, 71 Yale LJ. 1226, 1262 (1962) (stating that of 108 lay people
surveyed, 55 said they would be less likely to make free disclosure to a lawyer if there
were no attorney-client privilege, 37 said they would not be less likely to disclose, and
16 said they did not know how the absence of the privilege would affect their willing-
ness to disclose).
86. See Wolfram, supra note 62, at 300 (noting that keeping client confidences
signals a lawyer's loyalty to her client and inspires client trust); Robert P. Mosteller,
Child Abuse Reporting Laws and Attorney-Client Confidences: The Reality and the
Specter of Lawyer as Informant, 42 Duke LJ. 203, 266 (1992) (arguing that maintain-
ing client confidences honors client autonomy "by maintaining client control over pri-
vate information"); Albert W. Alschuler, The Preservation of a Client's Confidences:
One Value Among Many or a Categorical Imperative?, 52 U. Colo. L. Rev. 349, 351-52
(1981) (asserting that the attorney-client privilege plays a central role in promoting a
client's sense that our legal system is fair and that someone is on his side). Alschuler
also points out that, in the absence of the privilege's protection, a client is forced to
determine, for himself, what he should and should not share with his lawyer. Once
the client must engage in this calculation, the lawyer becomes part of the system
against which the client struggles, and control, as the client sees it, rests firmly with
the lawyer. Id. at 352.
87. I am indebted to Gayle Hafner of the Maryland Legal Aid Bureau for this
insight. It was through watching her speak with her new child clients in the simple
language of keeping and telling secrets that I learned the power of this method of
creating lawyer-client intimacy, and conveying the message of client control.
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secrets, for these concepts are part of the ordinary social world of a
child.88
What makes the message extraordinary is not the concepts, them-
selves, but their application to the child's relationship with the
strange, important adult. In pledging to keep secrets, the lawyer
promises to follow the rules that children ordinarily can only impose
on one another. In making the pledge, she signals her willingness to
cross the power line between child and adult.
Far more important to a child's appreciation of his lawyer's role
than the pledge of secrecy is the honoring of that pledge. When a
lawyer demonstrates that she will keep her client's secrets, even the
darkest family secrets, she will earn her client's trust and convince her
client, if anything can, that he is, in fact, in control.8 9 In part V, below,
I will briefly discuss how a lawyer can demonstrate that commitment
to keeping secrets to her child clients.
The more clear-cut and absolute the duty of confidentiality, the
greater a child's ability to understand that duty and, consequently, the
lawyer's role as a whole. Muddying the waters, however, are a
number of qualifiers that exist only for children. First, state reporting
laws mandate the reporting of child abuse by a broad range of profes-
sionals working with children. While lawyers are not, in most states,
expressly included among the list of mandated reporters, many states'
laws can be construed to include them in their more generic language
describing the circumstances under which reporting is mandatory.90
Where lawyers construe the law to require them to report abuse and
neglect, the message to children will be more confusing than comfort-
ing. An explanation that says, "I am required to keep everything you
tell me secret, except things you say that make me think that you are
in danger," tells a child what he will already expect, namely that if he
tells his secrets to his lawyer, he will lose control over them.91 While
88. See Janet W. Astington, The Child's Discovery of the Mind 180 (1993) (sum-
marizing studies that suggest that, by five years of age, children are capable of keep-
ing secrets); Lickona, supra note 9, at 114, 119 (noting that whether conduct gets the
actor in trouble serves as one of children's first means of determining moral
culpability).
89. See I Hazard & Hodes, supra note 52, § 1.6:101, at 130.1 (stating that "lawyers
demonstrate the moral values of trust and loyalty when they say they will keep quiet
and then do so, even when there are compelling reasons to speak out" (citation
omitted)).
90. See Mosteller, supra note 86, at 208; cf. Haralambie, supra note 3, at 36 (noting
that unless a state's child abuse statute expressly abrogates the attorney-client privi-
lege, the privilege remains, though it is not clear whether it applies to an attorney
assuming the GAL role).
91. See Wolfram, supra note 62, at 245 (observing that one of the purposes of
confidentiality protections is to assure clients that they can maintain control over their
own private information). In his essay on the confidentiality protection, Professor
Alschuler points to another potential problem with explaining the limits of the protec-
tion to the client-namely, that it carries a veiled warning to the client not to say
precisely those things that the lawyer would be required to disclose. Alschuler, supra
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the client will gain something by having the duty and the limitation
explained,9 z the information is unlikely to foster the relationship of
trust intended by the confidentiality principle,93 particularly in the
early phase of the proceedings when parental mistreatment is most
relevant.94
Even in states where lawyers are not mandated reporters, the signif-
icance of the confidentiality duty is undermined by the fact that, law-
yer aside, the child is not in control of his own private information. In
most cases, parents, even those whose children have been removed
from their care, have a right to access a child's mental health
records, 95 school reports,96 and child welfare records97 (which may in-
note 86, at 353. In our context, the concern would be that a child, informed of his
lawyer's obligation to report abuse, would carefully avoid any discussion of matters
that would suggest he might be in danger.
92. See, for example, the comments of Chaplan's interviewee, Neil, who suggests
that lawyers should warn child clients of the lawyer's reporting obligation before chil-
dren reveal the relevant information so that children can decide what to tell their
lawyers with a full understanding of the consequences. Chaplan, supra note 13, at
1780.
93. Alschuler, supra note 86, at 353 & n.10 (stating that "giving each client [a] list
of exceptions to the obligation of confidentiality before asking for his story [ ] would
almost certainly destroy any significant sense of confidentiality within the attorney-
client relationship," if such a list is even understood by the client). But see W. William
Hodes, The Code of Professional Responsibility, the Kutak Rules, and the Trial Law-
yer's Code: Surprisingly, Three Peas in a Pod, 35 U. Miami L. Rev. 739, 786, 813
(1981) (warning a client about the limits of the confidentiality protection may inspire
the "fullest flowering of the trusting relationship, rather than its death knell"); Pizzi-
menti, supra note 59, at 476-81 (suggesting that disclosing the limits of the confidenti-
ality protection enhances client autonomy and the client's trust in the client-lawyer
relationship).
Without addressing whether an explanation of the duty or intention to report child
abuse would undermine their trust in their lawyers, the six children interviewed by
Chaplan concluded that their lawyers should report suspected abuse and neglect, even
when the confidentiality principles counseled otherwise. Chaplan, supra note 13. at
1778.
94. Reporting laws require only the reporting of information suggesting that a
child has been abused or neglected, as defined by state law. Reporting obligations
generally are most relevant in the early phases of dependency representation, particu-
larly prior to the adjudicatory hearing, where the parent's conduct is directly at issue.
Later in the proceedings, particularly when the child has been removed from the
home, many other issues, including the appropriateness of a child's placement, the
parents' compliance with the terms of case plan agreements, and the quality of visits,
among other things, are more likely to be at issue. Children's confidences about their
feelings toward adults, their objectives in the litigation, and their own conduct are not
subject to reporting requirements. This does not mean, of course, that abuse and
neglect issues cannot reemerge. The conduct of the child's new caretakers, as well as
parental conduct during visits or once the child is returned to the home, can all re-
introduce the issue of child maltreatment, and the lawyer's potential duty to report.
95. See, e.g., 55 Pa. Code § 5100.33(a) (1991) (giving parents control over the re-
lease of mental health records for children under 14 years of age).
96. See Federal Educational Rights and Privacy Act (the Buckley Amendment),
20 U.S.C. §§ 1232g, 1232i (1994) (requiring educational agencies and institutions to
make school records accessible to parents and students as a condition of receipt of
federal funds).
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clude information about a child's fear of his parents, his desire to be
adopted, or other private information only indirectly related to the
court procedure, such as his drug use and sexual activity). Moreover,
no confidentiality rule confines disclosure by. the parents, so they are
free to share this information, as well as any secrets told to them by
their children, with anyone they please.98
More frequently in the lawyer's control, however, is the lawyer's
own access to confidential information such as medical, psychiatric,
and educational reports. Statutes providing for the representation of
children, and orders appointing counsel for children, generally author-
ize the lawyer to review all relevant information about the child, in-
cluding health, mental health, and educational information, and to
release this information to others, both without client consent.99 Even
the most committed "traditional" attorneys for children will be loathe
to encumber their access to this information by ensuring that they
have their client's consent before accessing each piece of information
in question.
Although it is hard for any lawyer to put herself in a position of
being less prepared by limiting her access to information, the tradi-
tional attorney role demands that the child client be treated as the
adult client. It is essential to let the child control at least his lawyer's
access to his private information that has not already been disclosed to
other parties in the course of the litigation if the confidentiality princi-
ple, and, more fundamentally, the principle of client control are to
mean anything to the child.100 Until the child understands that his
97. See, e.g., 55 Pa. Code § 3680.35(b)(1)(i) (1987) (authorizing parent access to
child welfare records of a child upon request).
98. Cf. Riccardi v. Tampax, Inc., 493 N.Y.S.2d 798, 799 (App. Div. 1985) (illustrat-
ing parents' authority to waive the doctor-patient privilege on behalf of their child).
In rare instances, a lawyer can invoke the power of the court to block the release of
private information to a parent. Such action sends a powerful message to the child
about his strength in the process and the loyalty and respect shown to the child by his
attorney. See, e.g., Daniel C.H. v. Daniel O.H., 269 Cal. Rptr. 624, 630-31 (Ct. App.
1990) (holding that a parent accused of child molestation should not be entitled to
have access to communications made by the child to a therapist as part of treatment
for abuse).
99. See HHS Study, supra note 5, at 2-2 (citing statutes giving children's represent-
atives "open access to various records and information concerning the child ... in-
cluding records from.., public agencies, hospitals .... psychologists, ... courts, law
enforcement, social services, and schools"); see also Haralambie, supra note 3, at 7-9
(discussing a lawyer's authority, by statute or court order, to access and disclose confi-
dential information). Although both sources speak in terms of "GALs," it appears
that their discussions intend to encompass all lawyers charged under state law with
the representation of children in dependency matters, and, in Haralambie's discus-
sion, lawyers representing children in private custody disputes, as well.
100. The commentary accompanying the Proposed ABA Standards calls on lawyers
of older children to obtain the child's consent before accessing the child's records,
even if the consent is not required. In his letter to Linda Elrod commenting on this
requirement, Professor John J. Sampson argues that requiring the child's consent to
access materials that can be accessed by every other party in the litigation does little
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lawyer comes, and must come, to him for direction concerning her
actions in his case, the lawyer will remain, in the child client's eyes,
just another adult controlling his life, in the name of helping him out.
There is, of course, a final, moral reservation to the application of
the confidentiality principle to children: Keeping children's secrets
may put them at risk of harm. With adult clients, fulfilling the duty of
confidentiality generally threatens to harm (or leave unredressed old
harms of) third parties. 1 1 But with children, it is the lawyer's very
own clients, notably child clients, who stand to be harmed by the law-
yer's refusal to speak.' 02 The danger that children will mistakenly rely
on their lawyers to publish their secrets where necessary to rescue and
protect them can be prevented only by ensuring that children truly
understand their lawyers' commitment to secrecy. But, again, chil-
dren's difficulty comprehending and believing the traditional attorney
role will make successfully communicating the confidentiality obliga-
tion a daunting task for the child's lawyer. And while lawyers who
succeed in communicating their commitment to secrecy will have the
satisfaction of knowing that their client understands who they are, and
who they are not, this will strike many a thoughtful lawyer as a small
satisfaction indeed. It is an ultimate commitment to protection over
client control that drives many lawyers toward the GAL model.
b. Ethical Obligations Under the GAL Model
Whether directed by statute, court order, or their own judgment,
lawyers' assumption of the GAL role in representing children is gen-
erally driven by a concern that children need to be protected from
their own bad decision making, and from the bad actors in their lives,
whom they may be unwilling to betray. 0 3 To ensure that their clients
are adequately protected, GALs abandon the most fundamental as-
to protect the child's confidentiality, and "authorize[s] the child to direct his or her
own lawyer to commit malpractice," by ensuring her that she is unaware of materials
that may be "part and parcel of the litigation." See Letter from Professor John J.
Sampson to Linda Elrod (Oct. 6, 1995) (on file with the Fordham Law Review). Be-
cause I agree that information already disclosed to other parties in the litigation
should be reviewed as part of the representation of any client, I narrow my recom-
mendation regarding when consent should be required to information not already
disclosed.
101. 1 Hazard & Hodes, supra note 52, § 1.6:102, at 130.2 (suggesting that the confi-
dentiality principle "often requires that victims of a client's misdeeds be forsaken").
But see supra note 44 (qualifying my distinction between the confidences of adults and
children).
102. Some commentators have suggested that the ethical rules authorizing a breach
of confidentiality to prevent the client from committing criminal acts likely to lead to
the death or serious bodily harm of a third party should also be construed to authorize
disclosures to prevent the client from being seriously harmed by the criminal acts of
an abuser. See Haralambie, supra note 3, at 36.
103. See icL at 27 (criticizing the traditional attorney model for ignoring "the dra-
matic and often dangerous fact that the wishes of the child may be driven by irrational
forces and may even be self-destructive").
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pect of the client-lawyer relationship: They strip their clients of any
decision-making control and assume responsibility for ascertaining the
child's best interests. What, then, is left of the client-lawyer relation-
ship, and, consequently, the ethical principles that govern a lawyer's
conduct? More particularly, what ethical obligations, if any, does a
lawyer acting as GAL have to ensure that her client understands that
she will take whatever action she determines is in the child's best in-
terest, regardless of what the child thinks of that action?
Returning to the framework of Rule 1.14, we can analyze the
GAL's approach in two ways. First, the assumption of the GAL role
may reflect a determination that the entire normal client-lawyer rela-
tionship is not "reasonably possible."' Under this reading, the GAL
role replaces the lawyer-client relationship with a new relationship in
which the lawyer does not act as a lawyer, the client is not really a
client, or, perhaps, some combination of both. Second, the assump-
tion of the GAL role may reflect a determination that client-driven
decision making is not reasonably possible, but that the rest of a nor-
mal client-lawyer relationship (and hence the lawyer's ethical obliga-
tions flowing from that relationship) remains the same as for adult
clients. As the following discussion will establish, under both analy-
ses, the GAL still has an ethical obligation to ensure that the child
understands the GAL or "best interest" role, even if that understand-
ing compromises the GAL's ability to assess and advocate for the
child's best interests.
i. Constructing a New Relationship
(a) The GAL As Nonlawyer
If the GAL-child relationship is seen as a relationship entirely dis-
tinct from the "normal client-lawyer relationship," we must look to
how it functions in order to define it. It is tempting to suggest that,
once lawyers abandon the traditional client-lawyer relationship, they
are, in fact, not acting as lawyers at all, and therefore the ethical obli-
gations unique to lawyers (as opposed to those applicable to all citi-
zens) are inapposite. Before addressing the limitations of this
analysis, it is worth giving it its due. Analyzing the GAL as a nonlaw-
yer does suggest a rudimentary minimum: Where lawyers assume a
role entirely disconnected from their ethical obligations as lawyers,
the basic moral values of honesty and fair play (and, perhaps, the legal
prohibitions against fraud) dictate that the children they "represent"
must at least be warned that their lawyers really are not acting as law-
yers at all. Better yet, in such circumstances, the child, the court, and
the other parties should never even be informed that the person ap-
pointed to represent the child is a lawyer, for that fact is no more
relevant to what she will or must do than if she were assigned to take
over the teaching of a second grade class. Indeed, to the extent the
GAL role is interpreted to allow a wholesale abandonment of the law-
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yer's professional role, there is no reason GALs should be lawyers at
all. Social workers, psychologists, neighbors, and community leaders
may all be better judges of a child's best interests than lawyers, who
have neither formal nor experiential training in what is best for
children.10 4
Many states mandate, however, that the child's best interests be
represented by none other than a lawyer, and lawyers assuming the
GAL role still function in some contexts very much like lawyers. The
GAL's conduct in court, and in relating to the other lawyers and par-
ties in the case, is not appreciably altered by her best interest mis-
sion.10 5 The assumption of the GAL role reflects a significant shift in
her professional relationship with her client, but in no way signals an
abandonment of her professional role in the system. To the extent she
remains a player in that system, the relevant ethical rules of that sys-
tem still apply.
(b) The Child As Nonclient
While a GAL lawyer maintains her professional obligations even
outside the normal client-lawyer relationship, the child's role as client
changes dramatically. Far from establishing the objectives of repre-
sentation and controlling decision making, as contemplated by the
Rules, 1°6 the child becomes an object whose interests are determined
by the GAL, and whose views are taken as relevant, but not control-
ling. A child in this position is stripped of the status of client, and of
the basic ethical protections that flow from that status.' 0 7
A GAL's wholesale abandonment of the normal client-lawyer rela-
tionship presumably reflects her determination that the child "cannot
adequately act in [his] own interest." 08 When such a determination is
made, Rule 1.14(b) authorizes appointment of a guardian charged
with identifying the named client's interests for the lawyer.'0 9 This
104. See Heartz, supra note 5, at 338-40.
105. In some states, the responsibilities of GALs for filing motions, issuing subpoe-
nas, examining, and cross-examining witnesses, among other lawyerly functions, are
expressly provided for by statute. See statutes cited in HHS Study, supra note 5, at 2-3
& nn.28-34.
106. See Model Rules, supra note 51, Rule 1.2(a); see also supra note 74 and accom-
panying text.
107. See 1 Hazard & Hodes, supra note 52, § 1.14:101, at 439 (positing that where a
person's impairments are so great that a normal client-lawyer relationship is not rea-
sonably possible, "assigning that person the role of 'client' is a mere formality").
108. Model Rules, supra note 51, Rule 1.14(b); see also 1 Hazard & Hodes, supra
note 52, § 1.14:101, at 439 (suggesting that Rule 1.14(a) applies where a normal client-
lawyer relationship is difficult, whereas Rule 1.14(b) applies where a normal client-
lawyer relationship is impossible).
109. Model Rules, supra note 51, Rule 1.14(b).
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guardian, then, takes over the client's role of directing the lawyer's
actions. 10
As the commentary to Rule 1.14(b) acknowledges, however, ap-
pointment of a separate guardian may prove "expensive or traumatic
to the client.""' In such cases, the lawyer is called upon to "act as de
facto guardian."1 2 Where a lawyer appointed to represent a child as-
sumes the role of guardian for that child, she relies on her own views
(as the guardian), rather than those of the child, to determine what
interests to advocate (as the lawyer). In shifting decision making from
the child to herself, the lawyer has, in effect, changed clients: Her
ultimate client loyalty is owed, not to the child "in the flesh," but to
the abstraction of the child's best interests."13 The GAL owes her
duty of loyalty not to the child's view of his interests, but to her own.
(c) Ethical Principles Applicable Where the Child is Viewed As a
Nonclient
Under the above analysis, children are divested of all the ethical
protections owed to clients, most particularly the protections of loy-
alty and confidentiality, for they lack the status that entitles them to
(indeed, justifies) those protections. Lacking the protections owed by
attorneys to their clients, surely children are entitled, at a minimum,
to the protections afforded to nonclients; for it seems the epitome of
unfairness to deny the child the ethical protections due to the client
and nonclient alike-all in the name of the child's best interests.
Lawyers owe noncients with whom they come in contact in the
course of representation basic duties of honesty,1' 4 respect, 115 and,
most significant for our discussion, the duty to ensure that the non-
client does not misperceive the lawyer's role.1 6 The Rules make spe-
cial mention of the lawyer's obligation to ensure that unrepresented
110. See id. Rule 1.14(b) cmt. 3 ("If a legal representative has already been ap-
pointed for the client, the lawyer should ordinarily look to the representative for deci-
sions on behalf of the client."); 1 Hazard & Hodes, supra note 52, § 1.14:102, at 440.1
(suggesting that a guardian appointed to represent the interests of a severely disabled
person be viewed as the lawyer's primary client and the disabled person as the deriva-
tive client, or third party beneficiary); see also Noe v. True, 507 F.2d 9, 12 (6th Cir.
1974) (noting that a GAL is an officer of the court with authority to "engage counsel,
file suit, and to prosecute, control and direct the litigation").
111. Model Rules, supra note 51, Rule 1.14 cmt.
112. Id.
113. See I Hazard & Hodes, supra note 52, § 1.14:102, at 440 (suggesting that where
the client is unable to communicate, the lawyer "does not really represent [the client]
as such, but instead represents an abstraction: 'the best interests of that person' ").
114. See Model Rules, supra note 51, Rule 4.1 ("Truthfulness in Statements to
Others").
115. See id. Rule 4.4 ("Respect for Rights of Third Persons").
116. See id. Rule 4.3 ("Dealing with Unrepresented Persons"). Rule 4.3 provides:
In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by
counsel, a lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested.
When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the unrepresented
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individuals understand that the lawyer is not disinterested (that is, not
free to assist the nonclient impartially) and to clarify the lawyer's loy-
alties if the noncient appears to misunderstand. In short, it is the law-
yer's responsibility to protect the nonclient from misplaced reliance
on the lawyer, even if that reliance would aid the lawyer's service of
her own client. Lawyers cannot exploit nonclients' inaccurate belief
that communications will be kept confidential, or unbiased advice
given, to serve the interests of their true clients. While lawyers do not
owe a duty of loyalty to nonclients, they are certainly obligated to
prevent nonclients from mistakenly acting upon the belief that the
lawyer does, in fact, owe them that duty." 7
The analogy to the best-interest representation of children is appar-
ent: Where an attorney's true client is not the child, in the traditional
sense, but the child's best interests as the GAL perceives them, at a
minimum, the GAL must ensure that the child does not mistakenly
conclude that the lawyer's duties are owed to him. In other words, the"
GAL must inform the child that she may urge the court to take a
position contrary to the child's wishes, and is under no obligation to
keep any information about the child or his family confidential.", To
fail to ensure that the child understands the limits of the GAL's repre-
sentation is to set the child up to rely inappropriately on the GAL. To
rely on the child's role confusion to extract family secrets or the
child's private views is no less exploitive than relying on the misplaced
confessions of the classic unrepresented party.
(d) The Child As Entity Constituent
Another approach to analyzing the GAL's obligation to ensure the
child's understanding of her role is suggested by Hazard and Hodes in
their treatise The Law of Lawyering. Hazard and Hodes suggest that
a lawyer for a disabled client can be analogized to the lawyer for an
entity (most classically a corporation) whose ethical obligation is to
represent that entity's interests, even in the face of conflicts with that
entity's constituents or agents. 1 9 By analogy, the GAL's ultimate eth-
ical duty is not to the child (the constituent) but to the entity
equivalent-the child's best interests.
Just as entity lawyers will consult with entity constituents to shape
the entity representation (and, indeed they will conduct their repre-
sentation almost exclusively through these constituents) so, too, the
GAL will consult with the child to help determine what will best serve
person misunderstands the lawyer's role in the matter, the lawyer shall make
reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding.
Id. (emphasis added).
117. Id. Rule 4.3 cmt.
118. For a discussion of a lawyer's confidentiality obligations under this analysis,
see supra section III.B.(b)(i))(f).
119. 1 Hazard & Hodes, supra note 52, § 1.14:102, at 440.
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the child's interests. And just like entity representation, absent a con-
flict, representation of the child's best interests will be indistinguish-
able from representation of the child in the traditional sense. But, in
both contexts, the people are not the clients. In both contexts, the
real clients, to which the lawyers owe their client-lawyer duties of loy-
alty and confidentiality, are the best interest abstractions. 2 °
Hazard and Hodes stop their analogy, however, at the point of role
description. They do not take the next step: exploring what obliga-
tions the analogy suggests the lawyer owes the "constituent" child.
(e) Ethical Principles Applicable Where Child is Viewed As
Nonclient Entity Constituent
Rule 1.13, which sets out an attorney's ethical obligations in the
context of entity (or organizational) representation, specifically ad-
dresses the duty owed to nonclient constituents: "In dealing with an
organization's directors, officers ... or other constituents, a lawyer
shall explain the identity of the client when it is apparent that the
organization's interests are adverse to those of the constituents with
whom the lawyer is dealing.' 12 1
Particularly because constituents are likely to be confused about
whom the lawyer represents, it is essential that entity lawyers protect
constituents from their own confusion. Absent the clarifying informa-
tion, the constituents, who routinely consult with the lawyer about the
entity representation, and who are, themselves, charged with serving
the entity's interests, will be inclined to assume, wrongly, of course,
that any damaging communications they share with the lawyer will be
kept confidential, and that the lawyer is an appropriate source of ad-
vice about the constituent's potential legal problems."2 As Hazard
and Hodes put it, fairness dictates that the lawyer "explain exactly
who he represents, when dealing with constituents who might other-
wise be misled.' 23
No other "constituent" is more vulnerable to being misled than a
child whose lawyer talks about representing him, when m fact she
owes him no duty of loyalty. Like the entity constituent, the child
provides the lawyer with material guidance in the course of the repre-
sentation. Like the entity constituent, the child sees himself as the
safeguarder of the abstract interests at stake. And, as in the entity
context, the lawyer has a strong motive to encourage the child's confu-
sion. Unlike constituents in the classic entity relationship, however,
children represented by GALs generally do not have the option of
120. Id.
121. Model Rules, supra note 51, Rule 1.13(d).
122. See 1 Hazard-& Hodes, supra note 52, § 1.13:109, at 400.
123. Id § 1.14:109, at 400 n.3.
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retaining separate counsel."2 4 This means that the only person in a
position to warn the child about the limits of his protections in the
legal system is the GAL herself.
In discussing entity representation, Hazard and Hodes note that this
representation is very difficult in practice:
Lawyer-client communication about the representation is particu-
larly tricky, because an entity is a legal fiction and cannot literally
'consult' a lawyer or give her directions. Instead, communication in
both directions is of necessity accomplished through human ac-
tors-the very individuals who are not to be considered clients. The
matter is further complicated by the fact that although these indi-
viduals are not themselves clients, they generally are the trusted
agents of the entity client and are generally presumed to be acting
in its best interests. Paradoxically, therefore, a lawyer for an organi-
zation normally serves his client-the entity-by suspending the fic-
tion and consulting with the available human actors after all.125
Hazard and Hodes go on to say that a lawyer best serves the entity by
"keeping lines of communication open to those whose job it is to act
for the entity, and being guided by their judgments, which she should
normally assume are in the best interests of the entity.' '12 6
Of course, GALs generally make no such assumptions about the
correctness of the child's views and judgments. Indeed, rather than
assuming that children's judgments are normally in their best inter-
ests, GALs start from the assumption that children are prone to mak-
ing bad decisions on their own behalf. Unlike entity representation,
which is guided by the judgment and actions of constituents absent
strong legal indications to the contrary, the GAL has no such anchor
to tie her representation of the abstraction down to earth.' 2 7 Her lib-
erty and willingness to detach her best interest judgments entirely
from the judgments of the child suggest that her obligations to warn
the child of her true allegiance are even greater than those of the en-
tity representative.
124. Most children lack the sophistication and resources (financial and otherwise)
to seek out separate counsel. Even when they successfully do so, however, there is no
guarantee that the court or the guardian will authorize retention or appointment of
the separate counsel. For a particularly extreme example of a child's difficulty ob-
taining separate counsel of her choice to represent her own views in opposition to
those represented by her GAL, see In re A.W., 618 N.E. 2d 729 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
In that case, the Public Guardian appealed, unsuccessfully, the juvenile court's allow-
ance of the child's motion for substitution of counsel (which left his authority as GAL
unchanged), leaving the matter unresolved for over one year. Id at 733.
125. 1 Hazard & Hodes, supra note 52, § 1.13:102, at 388-89.
126. Id § 1.13:109, at 400.
127. Where the lawyer detaches her best interest inquiry from the views of her
client, she creates a considerable risk that she will impose her own values upon the
client, rather than determining, more objectively, what the best result would be for
the child. See id § 1.14:301, at 447.
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(f) Confidentiality Obligations to the Nonclient Child
The crux of the concern reflected in the rules governing obligations
to nonclients is that these noncients will reveal information to the
lawyer under the false impression that the information will be kept
confidential, or that it will only be used to serve the confider's inter-
ests. While, clearly, the lawyer owes the noncient no duty of confi-
dentiality,2 8 she cannot exploit the misunderstanding for the benefit
of her true client.
As Hazard and Hodes explain, again in the context of entity
representation:
[Where entity and constituent interests diverge,] it might be said
that the lawyer's duty of diligent representation requires him to dis-
cover as much information as he can from a [constituent] with inter-
ests potentially adverse to those of the entity, even if that person is
severely disadvantaged. However, although the lawyer's [constitu-
ents] are not entitled to the full loyalty that a client deserves, they
may have grown accustomed to treating the lawyer as if he owed
full loyalty to them, and may not understand that he has served
them only because they were serving a common master. Fairness
therefore dictates that they not be lulled into confiding in someone
who might become an adversary's lawyer. To learn confidences
under false pretenses would be taking unfair advantage of non-
clients, and must be avoided even if the information might be useful
to the clieit. 29
To get a sense of how these misplaced confidences are inspired in
children, it is worth briefly parsing the confidentiality protection. In
its classical form, the confidentiality protection prevents the publica-
tion of client confidences, absent client consent. But a client's interest
in confidentiality is often focused not specifically on avoiding publica-
tion, but on ensuring that the information in question is only used by
the lawyer for the client's benefit. The confidentiality obligation, par-
ticularly when coupled with the interrelated obligation of loyalty, pre-
vents a lawyer from using confidential information in a manner
detrimental to the client's interests. In other words, the confidential-
ity protection allows a client not only to prevent the publication of
information, but also to control for what ends the publication of infor-
mation is used.
As discussed earlier, children are far less likely than adults to as-
sume that their confidences will be protected. 3 0 To the extent chil-
128. Id § 1.6:101, at 128-30 (noting that confidentiality protections apply only to
clients, and therefore the threshold question in applying the confidentiality rule is
whether the person in question is, in fact, a client).
129. Id. § 1.13:501, at 430; see also Alschuler, supra note 86, at 351 (concluding that
it is unfair for a lawyer to "obtain information by implicit or explicit deception," even
if such deception produces information valuable to the legal system's search for
truth).
130. See supra section III.B.l.a.iii.
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dren's perceptions counsel them to hold their tongues, however,
GALs will have a strong motivation to foster a relationship that en-
courages children to speak freely. While scrupulous GALs will stop
short of promising secrecy (the classic confidentiality protection)
when they know they may not be able to honor that promise, they will
find it easier to encourage children to believe that they are "on their
side"-that they will use the information the child provides to help
the child achieve his desired ends. As in the entity context, the child's
confidences, gained under false pretenses, can prove invaluable to the
GAL's assessment of, and advocacy for, the child's best interests. But
the value of the information cannot outweigh the injustice done to the
child by using professional smoke and mirrors to trick the child into
trusting the GAL too much.
Under Rule 1.13, confidentiality protections prevent the entity law-
yer from going outside the entity to disclose information, whether
gained from the constituents or other sources, absent authorization
from the designated constituents.' 3' This prohibition applies even
where the lawyer believes such a disclosure would serve the entity's
(her client's) interests. In such situations, the attorney is limited to
sharing the information with the highest authority within the entity,
and, if the problem cannot be remedied, the lawyer's only recourse is
to resign.132
For a child represented by a GAL, in contrast, there is no
equivalent protection. The GAL, in service to her client (the child's
best interests, as she sees them) will disclose every relevant detail
about the child (whether gained through communications with the
child or other sources) to the highest authority over the best interest
abstraction-namely, the court. 33 While the court protects the confi-
dentiality of the information from the world at large, due process pro-
tections require the information to be shared with adverse parties-
the group from which the child will most wish to withhold the infor-
mation. Again, what fairness mandates in the entity context is doubly
mandated for the child, who is even less protected. The GAL must
ensure that the child understands that everything the child shares with
the GAL may be disclosed and used for whatever ends the GAL sees
fit, regardless of the child's views about these ends.
131. Model Rules, supra note 51, Rule 1.13.
132. Id Rule 1.13(b) & (c); see also 1 Hazard & Hodes, supra note 52, § 1.13:111, at
402 (noting that, although the drafters of the Rules proposed a provision authorizing
limited "loyal disclosures" where the lawyer had exhausted internal review mecha-
nisms and determined that disclosure outside the entity was necessary to protect the
interests of the entity, the loyal disclosure provision was deleted from the Rules, as
adopted).
133. In both dependency and custody matters, the court is commonly charged with
making best interest assessments on behalf of children. See, e.g., Ex parte Beasley, 564
So. 2d 950, 954-55 (Ala. 1990) (noting that the state standard applied in custody deter-
minations, whether or not the state is involved, is the best interest of the child
standard).
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ii. Maintaining Pieces of the Normal Client-Lawyer Relationship
(a) Defining the Modified Client-Lawyer Relationship
In justifying a "best interest" approach to representation, a lawyer
need not conclude that the entire normal client-lawyer relationship is
not "reasonably possible." The departure from client control can also
be read as a limited, albeit significant, departure from the normal cli-
ent-lawyer relationship, which in other respects the lawyer is still obli-
gated to preserve. 34 Under this analysis, the body of ethical
principles governing the client-lawyer relationship (rather than the
nonclient relationships, where the client-lawyer relationship is consid-
ered abandoned) still applies, to the extent these principles can be
squared with the shift in decision-making authority.
(b) Ethical Principles Applicable Where the Child is Viewed As a
Client in a Modified Client-Lawyer Relationship
Where a child is still conceived as the client, albeit a client repre-
sented very differently from a non-"disabled" client, he is entitled to
at least as much information as the nonclient about the limitations of
his representation and the risks associated with turning to his GAL for
advice and the communication of confidences. Although Rules 4.3
and 1.13 speak only in terms of a lawyer's obligations to clarify her
role to nonclients, this limited focus is premised on the assumption
that the risks associated with relying inappropriately on the expecta-
tions of a client-lawyer relationship are limited to those who are, in
fact, not in such a relationship. But for a child client, whose views will
not be used to set the objectives of the representation, and whose
secrets may be shared to the extent this is deemed to serve the child's
best interests, 135 the risk is just as real.
An application of the specific rules governing the client-lawyer rela-
tionship to this context bears out the ethical obligation of full role
disclosure. Rule 1.2(c) allows a lawyer to "limit the objectives" of her
representation only "if the client consents after consultation.' 36 A
GAL's unwillingness to take any position that conflicts with her own
view of the child's best interests reflects a clear and far-reaching limi-
tation on the scope of her representation. While the GAL has taken
the decision about how to limit representation away from the child
134. The commentary to Rule 1.14 seems to favor this reading, advising that
"[e]ven if the person does have a [separate] legal representative, the lawyer should as
far as possible accord the represented person the status of client." Model Rules, supra
note 51, Rule 1.14 cmt.
135. For a discussion of a GAL's confidentiality obligations under this analysis, see
infra section III.B..b.ii.(d).
136. Model Rules, supra note 51, Rule 1.2(c). Hazard and Hodes suggest that this
provision obligates a lawyer to ensure that the "client will understand the risks inher-
ent in contracting for limited legal services." 1 Hazard & Hodes, supra note 52,
§ 1.2:303, at 39.
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client (as part of her general assumption of decision-making author-
ity), the obligation to explain must remain, if the relationship is to be
preserved to the fullest extent possible.
The structure of Rule 1.4, governing a lawyer's communication obli-
gations, supports the severance of the lawyer's duty to inform from
the client's authority to decide. Rule 1.4 divides the lawyer's commu-
nication obligation into two parts: Subsection (a) speaks broadly of a
lawyer's general obligation to keep a client informed, while subsection
(b) focuses more specifically on lawyer-client communication as a
means of ensuring effective client decision making.' 37 Although Rule
1.4(b)'s connection between effective communication and client deci-
sion making is necessarily severed by the GAL approach, the attor-
ney's basic obligations set out in Rule 1.4(a) to "keep a client
reasonably informed about the status of a matter"'138 can and there-
fore should remain. And, as already noted, the commentary to Rule
1.14 makes clear that, even where a separate legal representative has
been appointed to make all legal decisions on behalf of an incompe-
tent client, the lawyer has a continuing obligation, as far as possible, to
keep the client informed. 13 9
In the context of this Article, the information to be conveyed to the
client is information about the GAL's role. To the extent communica-
tion of the GAL's role remains "reasonably possible,"'140 my analysis
circles back to my discussion of the obligations imposed on a child's
attorney assuming the "traditional attorney" role: Although a child's
minority will require his lawyer to communicate differently in order to
communicate effectively, a lawyer should be expected to make such
adjustments in order to achieve the purpose behind the communica-
tion obligation, namely a client who understands what his lawyer is
doing.
137. Model Rules, supra note 51, Rule 1.4(a) & (b). Wolfram distinguishes be-
tween "reporting" communications (governed by Rule 1.4(a)), and "consultative"
communications (governed by Rule 1.4(b)). Wolfram, supra note 62, at 164-65. Haz-
ard and Hodes suggest that Rule 1.4(a) focuses on communication as a means of im-
proving the client-lawyer relationship, whereas Rule 1.4(b) focuses on communication
as a means of ensuring meaningful client participation. 1 Hazard & Hodes, supra note
52, § 1.4:102, at 83. For a full text of Rule. 1.4, see supra note 67.
138. Model Rules, supra note 51, Rule 1.4(a).
139. Id. Rule 1.14 cmt. ("Even if the person does have a legal representative, the
lawyer should as far as possible accord the represented person the status of client,
particularly in maintaining communication." (emphasis added)).
140. I- Rule 1.14(a). My discussion here focuses on the nature of the GAL's ethi-
cal obligations. Later, I will discuss the extent to which meeting these obligations is
practically possible. Clearly, this division is somewhat artificial-few would contend
that lawyers are ethically obligated to do the impossible. Considering the scope of the
ethical obligations first, however, will focus the feasibility inquiry more precisely, and
will prevent the feasibility inquiry from swallowing up the ethical analysis.
17411996]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
(c) The Lawyer's Divided Loyalties
Perceiving the GAL-child relationship as a limited client-lawyer re-
lationship suggests another analogy that speaks to a GAL's obligation
to ensure that her client understands her role. Like the analogy to
entity representation, which suggests an analytical approach where the
child is viewed as an involved nonclient, the ethical principles gov-
erning potential conflicts of interest can illuminate our analysis where
the child is still viewed as a client, but a client whose lawyer's primary
loyalty is owed to a second client-the child's best interests. Applying
the conflict principles to this second GAL model supports my conten-
tion that a GAL is obligated to inform her child client about the limits
of her loyalty and the limits of the child's control over the
representation.
Growing out of a lawyer's duty of loyalty to her clients, and the
associated duty of confidentiality, 4' the conflict principles, set out in
Rules 1.7, 1.8, and 1.9,142 prohibit a lawyer from taking on additional
representation that threatens to undermine her representation of her
original client, unless both the original client and the potential client
consent to the new representation, after consultation. 43 Whether the
child is viewed as the original or the potential additional client, he has
a right to be informed of the lawyer's "other client," the best interest
client who will undermine the lawyer's ability to serve the expressed
interests of the child loyally. And if the analogy is played out, the
child, whether viewed as the original or the additional client, would
have authority to prevent the lawyer from undertaking the dual, con-
flicting representation. Viewing the child as the first client, and the
representation of the best interests as the potentially adverse client,
the child would have the authority, after consultation, to prevent his
lawyer from taking on the best interest representation. 44 Viewed the
141. See 1 Hazard & Hodes, supra note 52, § 1.6:105, at 155 (arguing that the chief
aspect of client loyalty implicated by the conflict of interest issues is the duty of
confidentiality).
142. Rule 1.7 of the Model Rules sets out the general rule governing potential con-
flicts; Rule 1.8 of the Model Rules focuses on potential conflicts between the interests
of the lawyer and of the client; and Rule 1.9 addresses potential conflicts between
former and current clients.
143. Rule 1.7(a) provides:
A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client will
be directly adverse to another client, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not ad-
versely affect the relationship with the other client; and
(2) each client consents after consultation.
Model Rules, supra note 51, Rule 1.7(a).
144. Moreover, regardless of client consent, Rule 1.7 prevents an attorney from
undertaking the additibnal representation unless he "reasonably believes the repre-
sentation will not adversely affect the relationship with the other [original] client."
Where the child is considered a separate client from the best interest client, it could
be argued that the best interest representation always has some adverse affect on the
child, who is deprived of a zealous advocate. This result is particularly true if "ad-
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other way (construing the best interest as the original client and the
child as the potentially adverse additional client) the child would have
the authority to reject the lawyer's representation, and seek separate
counsel. While both of these approaches appear eminently fair (and
both create the opportunity for securing separate representation for
the expressed and best interests of the child without focusing the
court's attention on the lawyer's disagreement with her client's pOSi-
tion), 45 these proposals exceed the scope of my discussion here. It is
asking far less of a lawyer, and surely only what is fair, to require her
to ensure that her client understands her loyalty conflict. Lacking the
power to control his lawyer's role or retain his own counsel, the child
surely at least has the right to protect himself from some of the most
harmful consequences of that divided loyalty.
(d) Confidentiality Obligations within the Modified Client-Lawyer
Relationship
One of the primary risks associated with a lawyer's representation
of two clients with potentially conflicting interests is the risk that the
duty of loyalty to one client will undermine the lawyer's commitment
to keeping the confidences of the other.' 46 The centrality of the confi-
dentiality obligation to the client-lawyer relationship requires us to
explore whether this "piece" of the relationship should be maintained
(and therefore what should be communicated to the child client)
where the GAL role is viewed as limiting, but not eliminating, the
client-lawyer relationship.
In theory, the GAL could still be duty-bound to keep confidences,
and could therefore inform her clients that their secrets were safe with
her. It is hard, however, to make much sense of this approach in the
context of best-interest representation.' 47 A lawyer charged with zeal-
ously advocating for her client's best interests can hardly be serving
that mission by keeping secret information that directly bears on those
interests. Indeed, it can be argued that revelations of confidences to
the court are permitted under Rule 1.6(a) as "impliedly authorized in
order to carry out the representation,' '148 where the terms of the rep-
resentation are established by a statute or court order directing the
versely effecting" is read, as Hazard and Hodes suggest it should be, to include "a
client's subjective feeling of betrayal." 1 Hazard & Hodes, supra note 52, § 1.7:207, at
236.3.
145. Unlike the options suggested in the text, which give the child the authority to
protect his own interest in having a zealous advocate, the common practice of requir-
ing the lawyer to request appointment of a separate GAL when she disagrees with her
own client's position places the child's lawyer in the untenable position of signaling to
the court her disagreement with the very position she is charged with advocating
zealously.
146. See 1 Hazard & Hodes, supra note 52, § 1.6:406, at 218.1
147. See, e.g., Ross v. Gadwah, 554 A.2d 1284, 1285 (N.H. 1988) (holding that the
attorney-client privilege does not apply where the attorney is appointed as GAL).
148. Model Rules, supra note 51, Rule 1.6(a).
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lawyer to advocate for her client's best interests. Most classically, a
GAL would be hard pressed to keep quiet about a child's reports of
abuse, particularly if those reports were the only or best source of the
information. 149 A GAL attempting to serve the best interests of her
client might even feel compelled to call her client to the stand, and to
challenge "unfavorable" testimony by eliciting the client's prior incon-
sistent statements, if such actions were necessary to achieve the end
she deemed best for the child.
But even if a GAL were able to walk the line between fulfilling the
best interest mission and preserving the client's confidences, the confi-
dentiality protection would remain a hollow one. While the GAL
might commit herself not to repeat the words uttered by her client (or
force her client to repeat the words in court), her position in court
about the child's best interests would inevitably be affected by what
her client has told her, regardless of the client's willingness to have the
information shared. In many instances, this position taking has the
effect of publishing the client's private communications, either be-
cause the only explanation of the GAL's unsupported position is that
she must have gained relevant information from her client, or because
the GAL explains in court, perhaps obliquely, that information pro-
vided by the child supports her otherwise unsupported position.15 °
Even where the GAL's position does not, in itself, publish the cli-
ent's communications (as to facts or to the client's feelings about the
issues in the case), it may put the client in a position where the court
or other parties force him to disclose information he intended to keep
secret. In a typical example, a parent may call on the child in court to
contradict the position taken by his GAL.
Finally, even if a GAL succeeds in avoiding direct and indirect dis-
closure of a client's secrets, she will certainly undermine the broader
confidentiality interest discussed above,' 51 that is, the client's interest
in ensuring that his otherwise secret statements are only used to fur-
ther his desired ends. This broader confidentiality obligation, so cen-
tral to representation by a lawyer with undivided loyalties, cannot be
squared with the GAL approach. By definition, client statements to a
149. Of course, where state reporting laws mandate that the lawyer report abuse
and neglect to state authorities, this mandate would trump any confidentiality duty set
out in the Rules, regardless of the model of representation. See supra note 90 and
accompanying text.
150. Sandra, one of the children interviewed by Janet Chaplan, captures this experi-
ence with the following description:
I only see you one time a year and it's like an hour before we go to court.
And then the first thing [the lawyer says] is "Oh, I want to speak to Sandra
alone." So then that makes my aunt feel like, "What's she telling them?"
and in time it makes it bad for me.... It kind of puts you on the spot if
you're in a bad situation. It's hard to open up because you're not sure. And
then you can't go in the court room, so you're wondering.
Chaplan, supra note 13, at 1771-72.
151. See supra discussion in section Ill.B.l.b.i.(f).
1744 [Vol. 64
MISPERCEPTIONS OF LAWYERS' ROLES
GAL will be used to guide the GAL's assessment and representation
of the child's best interests, regardless of whether this representation
is consistent with what the child wants.
Whether his very words are repeated, or simply inspire the GAL to
take particular action on his behalf, the child client loses control of the
private information he shares with his GAL, and, therefore, he cannot
be said to be protected by the confidentiality principle. Moreover, in
the pursuit of the child's best interests, the GAL is surely obligated to
uncover whatever confidential information she can from other
sources. Unlike the traditional attorney, who must risk sacrificing
thoroughness in the interest of preserving client control, the GAL is
intended to sacrifice client control to ensure a thorough and accurate
assessment of the child's best interests.
Despite retaining certain characteristics of a "normal client-lawyer
relationship," the child client in this second GAL scenario, just as in
the first (where the child is viewed as a nonclient), must be made to
understand, not only that he cannot control his own legal position, but
also that he cannot control the information he shares with his lawyer
in discussing what that legal position should be. While this explana-
tion may undermine the GAL's ability to ferret out and press for the
child's best interests, the GAL cannot ethically withhold the explana-
tion, or cultivate the child's misunderstandings, to induce the child to
say things he would otherwise not say.
2. The Value of Ethical Representation to Children
Under the traditional attorney model, the value of ensuring that the
child understands his lawyer's role is straightforward: Without the un-
derstanding, the child will make assumptions about this unknown
adult that will undermine the lawyer's ability to consult freely with the
child, identify the child's positions, and take direction from him. The
better the child understands what it means to have a "real lawyer"
acting on his behalf, the better the child can take advantage of that
lawyer's services-by bringing issues to the lawyer's attention, dis-
cussing options, and sharing sensitive information. And without this
understanding, the model will fail to have its intended empowering
effect. No matter how much power a lawyer is prepared to cede to
her child client, the child will not be empowered unless he under-
stands what his lawyer is offering. Helping the child to understand
that he has a champion, someone who will press his position no matter
the odds, will help him discover and use his power in the system.
But what of the GAL model? Here the benefits to the child of full
role disclosure are less clear. While honesty, forthrightness, and fair
play are all admirable virtues, does the child really benefit from their
exercise, if his GAL's effectiveness is diminished in the process? Put
another way, once it is determined that a child needs an adult, a law-
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yer, to protect him from his own bad judgments, shouldn't our reading
of the lawyer's ethical obligations be adapted to serve that end?
If children's best interests were obvious and unambiguous, GALs
might be justified in abandoning their traditional ethical obligations as
lawyers to achieve those clearly best ends. But best interests are, in
fact, extremely hard to define, 5 2 and no honest GAL can deny that
some of her best-interest judgments ultimately did not produce the
best results for her clients. The limitations on the GAL's ability to
identify best interests argue for full role disclosure to the child client
for several reasons.
First, only where the child fully understands that his GAL will take
whatever action she thinks is best, and more specifically, what particu-
lar actions the GAL is contemplating, will he be in a position to at-
tempt to influence those actions. This opportunity to influence the
GAL, in addition to offering the child a modicum of power in the
process, is likely to improve the quality of the GAL's best interest
judgments. 153 The child's greater expertise can refine and sometimes
entirely alter the GAL's crude judgments about what is best. For ex-
ample, a child having the benefit of understanding that his GAL plans
to oppose his desire to remain with his mother will have an opportu-
nity to convince the GAL that the alternative the GAL proposes, such
as living with the grandmother, is also not appropriate; or at least that
there is a better alternative (or an alternative the child will be more
comfortable with); or even that, given the problems with the alterna-
tives, remaining with the mother is not such a bad option for the child
after all. Although the GAL model allows decisions about positions
to rest ultimately with the GAL, requiring the GAL to share with her
client her overall goals in the representation, and her specific views
about how to achieve those goals, forces the GAL to hold those views
up to the light of her client's opinions and expertise. Indeed, a best
interest judgment made in the absence of this open conversation with
the client should be viewed with considerable skepticism.
152. See Duquette & Ramsey, supra note 3, at 353-54; Joseph Goldstein et al., Be-
yond the Best Interests of the Child 49-64 (1973); see also Martha L. Fmeman, The
Politics of Custody and the Transformation of American Custody Decision Making, 22
U.C. Davis L. Rev. 829, 835 & n.19 (1989) (discussing the indeterminancy of the best
interests test due to various factors that must be balanced); Robert H. Mnookin,
Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 Law
& Contemp. Probs., Summer 1975, at 226, 255-62 (discussing "the inherent in-
determinancy of the best-interests standard").
153. In her interview, Sandra made this point, which Chaplan summarizes as
follows:
[E]ven if the lawyer makes a decision to take a position different from the
child's preference, Sandra believes that if the child is involved in the deci-
sion-making process, the child is more likely to tell her lawyer what the
problem really is. Client-centered interviewing makes the difference be-
tween whether a client will talk to her lawyer or not, and whether the lawyer
can represent her effectively.
Chaplan, supra note 13, at 1772.
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Recognizing the value to the GAL of this open conversation calls
into question the assumption that a misled (and therefore overly trust-
ing) client will provide more useful information to the GAL than will
the well-informed (and therefore cautious and controlled) client. In
fact, in attempting to assess her client's best interests, the GAL will
inevitably face a trade-off between the value of the child's unguarded
candor and the value of his well-informed discourse. It is impossible
to determine, in the abstract, which type of participation will produce
more, or better, information for the GAL.
Full role disclosure, however, provides additional benefits to chil-
dren that go beyond the issue of GAL effectiveness. These benefits,
too, stem, at least in part, from the elusiveness of the best interest
inquiry. A second value to children of ensuring that they understand
the GAL's role and engage in an open exchange about the GAL's
positions is suggested by the workings of the juvenile and family
courts. The courts' process of ascertaining best interest is flawed, not
only because it often produces bad results, but also because it tram-
ples children's dignity along the way. Children are made to feel irrele-
vant, and even worthless, by a court process that pays no attention to
them,154 and presumes that they have nothing valuable to say. If the
end point of all these proceedings were the Taj Mahal for all children,
the lack of respect they received along the way would still matter, but
not as much. Given that the end result is so likely to be bleak, and
very possibly not even the "best" of the possible bleak results, the
injury of disrespect is unpardonable. A GAL can offer only a chance
of helping the child through the positions she takes in court, but she
can guarantee her client a relationship of respect by sharing her role
and her positions openly with her client. In a world full of bad breaks
for these children, that respect is a tremendous gift, and undoubtedly
serves children's best interests.
Finally, the GAL has something to offer the child that the tradi-
tional attorney does not: The GAL offers the child the comfort of
knowing that someone else has taken over the burden of decision
making, and that some adult in the process is charged with safeguard-
ing his interests against all the other, potentially destructive, forces at
work. The GAL may not be able to pull off a good result for the child,
either because she takes the wrong positions, or because the court
154. As noted above, children are often never seen by the judge. See HHS study,
supra note 5, at 5-26 (reporting that children rarely speak in court). Proceedings
themselves, which decide crucial matters such as where children will live, whether
they will get to see their parents, what services they will receive, or whether they will
be freed for adoption, often last for only minutes. See NCJFCJ Resource Guidelines,
supra note 21, at 10 (noting that deficient resources, and increased caseloads, hearings
and parties have "gravely" affected the quality of the hearings, which are "often
rushed"); Philadelphia Citizens for Children and Youth, Report of the Dependency
Court Watch Project 5 (1990) (reporting that of 529 cases observed, 36% lasted less
than five minutes, and only .4% lasted over 45 minutes).
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isn't persuaded by her arguments; but the child can know that the
GAL is trying to get the best result, and that her only concern in the
proceeding is the child's welfare. Like the traditional attorney bene-
fits of empowerment and control, however, the GAL's commitment to
relieving the child's burden and, in her own way, fighting against all
odds for the child, has no value to the child unless he is aware of this
commitment. While ensuring that children understand the GAL role
will prove disempowering to some, it will prove liberating to others.
Explaining the GAL role offers children the relief of knowing that
they bear no responsibility for making the hard decisions with poten-
tially terrible consequences for the people they love.155
My own experience and prejudices suggest that from a fairly young
age, most, but by no means all, children value having control in their
relationships with lawyers more than they value being protected by
their lawyers. 56 If the role being taken is, in fact, the protective role,
however, children might as well at least have the benefit of knowing
that they have a protector. Without that understanding, the child may
confuse the GAL's conscientious assessment of the child's long term
interests-leading to advocacy for a position contrary to the child's-
with a careless indifference to the child's thoughts and feelings.
All discussions of ethics fall back, ultimately, on our sense of what is
right. It is my strong sense, based on my experience representing chil-
dren and my observations about how the system operates on behalf of
these children, that the most important thing a lawyer under either
model can do for her child client is to show him respect, by dealing
with him in an honest, straightforward manner. My analysis does push
the lawyer toward the traditional attorney model, because this model
lends itself more easily to an open exchange about roles and positions.
155. See Mlyniec, supra note 4, at 13-14 (noting that asking a child to choose be-
tween parents in a custody proceeding can impose a heavy burden on the child);
Landsman & Minow, supra note 6, at 1165 ("Studies of children of divorce indicate
that there may be very good reasons for a child's decision not to become directly
involved in the dispute over his custody .... ").
A lawyer assuming the, traditional attorney role also may lessen the burden on the
child by explaining that even though she will press the child's positions zealously in
court, the judge will ultimately make the decisions. But many children can appreciate
that if their position is relevant at all, it might change the judge's decision. And in
some jurisdictions, lawyers report that courts tend to go along with whatever the
child's attorney advocates. See id at 1184. Moreover, simply taking a'position in
court and having that position known to their parents, can be burdensome enough for
some children, regardless of whether the child's position carries any weight with the
judge.
156. For discussions of children's resentment at being excluded from involvement
in decision making in the context of divorce proceedings, see sources cited in Lands-
man & Minow, supra note 6, at 1164 n.184. But see Chaplan, supra note 13, at 1783(concluding that while children wanted to be included in decision making, they pre-
ferred to think of their lawyers as protectors rather than as simple advocates).
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I am convinced, however, that it matters far less which role is assumed
than that the role is communicated to the child.
1 57
IV. CHECKING THE LAWYER'S ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS AGAINST
THE CHILD'S CAPACITY TO UNDERSTAND THE LAWYER'S
ROLE
A. The Link Between Ethics and Capacity
Children's frequent confusion about their lawyers' roles cannot be
explained away simply as the product of inattentive lawyering. While
a lawyer's failure to attend to her client's confusion will certainly exac-
erbate the problem, even a lawyer's most conscientious attempts to
explain her role may fail to illuminate (or convince) the confused cli-
ent. The very commonness of these misperceptions in my own experi-
ence, and in my observation of highly skilled lawyers, reflects just how
difficult it is to communicate the roles effectively to children. As dis-
cussed in part II, children have every reason not to understand their
lawyers' roles and the relationships they are expected to have with
their lawyers. Children may be particularly resistant to understanding
explanations about the traditional attorney role because it relies on
the unlikely premise that an adult will cede authority to a child, but
both roles are confusing for children, who lack the context and experi-
ence to make sense of these unusual relationships.
58
The difficulty even the most conscientious lawyers have in convey-
ing their roles to their child clients raises the question whether such
role communication is in fact possible. Ultimately, I must measure my
ethical analysis against the reality of what can be done. This takes us
back to Rule 1.14's "reasonably possible" inquiry, which recognizes
157. Howard Lesnick's comments, in a very different context, offer a fruitful com-
parison. In considering "whether an attorney had any legitimate independent inter-
ests in the way a case was to be handled on behalf of a client," Professor Lesnick
writes:
I've come to a curious conclusion: I honestly do not think it matters which
position the attorney takes-to leave the final decision with the client or
insist on keeping it-so much as I think it matters whether the attorney
makes either decision in a way that respects the concerns of both attorney
and client, and treats the client as an understanding independent person,
with interests and sensibilities separate from the attorney, and the ability
and obligation to assume responsibility for his or her decisions.
Elizabeth Dvorkin et al., Becoming a Lawyer: A Humanistic Perspective on Legal
Education and Professionalism 200, 202 (1981).
158. As discussed above, children's misperceptions of the GAL's role can probably
be attributed, in part, to the emotional and professional difficulties GALs have in
totally "coming clean" about their role and about the details of the positions they are
taking. But even if the GAL takes pains to clarify her role, the child is likely to
remain confused, because, just like the child represented by the traditional attorney,
the child has little sense of the context in which the GAL performs her
representation.
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that there are practical limitations to a lawyer's ethical obligations to
her disabled clients.
Under my analysis, the GAL role is premised on the conclusion
that, in whole or in part, the normal client-lawyer relationship is not
reasonably possible. From this premise, one could argue that the
same considerations that justify the GAL approach, make effective
role explanation to the .child impossible, and therefore not ethically
required, under the GAL model. But as a matter of ethical analysis,
there is no reason to assume that the ability to maintain a normal
client-lawyer relationship and the ability to achieve normal client-law-
yer role understanding coincide. Indeed, the commentary to Rule
1.14 expressly counsels against equating the capacity to direct repre-
sentation with the capacity to be informed, directing that: "Even if
the [client] does have a legal representative," (reflecting someone's
determination that the client cannot appropriately identify his own in-
terests) "the lawyer should as far as possible accord the represented
person the status of client, particularly in maintaining communica-
tion.'1 59 Although the comment concedes that communication will
sometimes not be possible, it clearly disjoins that assessment from the
lawyer's assessment of decision-making capacity.
B. Children's Developmental Capacity to Understand Roles
Assessing children's ability to comprehend roles requires a look at
what we know about child development. Studies of children's acquisi-
tion of social role understanding suggest that children's role compre-
hension increases dramatically in sophistication between the ages of
(roughly) three and eight.'60 Before the age of three, children gener-
ally have little comprehension of professional roles.' 6 ' At roughly
three years of age, most children perceive the professionals with
whom they are familiar as a cluster of behaviors and characteristics
(for example, doctors are people who wear white coats and give
shots).'6 Children at this stage are still too young to comprehend
159. Model Rules, supra note 51, Rule 1.14 cmt. (emphasis added).
160. Although I know of no studies that have looked expressly at children's com-
prehension of the lawyer-client role, studies about role comprehension, generally, and
about children's developing understanding of the doctor-patient roles, particularly,
suggest a relatively consistent pattern of development during these years. See gener-
ally Malcolm W. Watson, Development of Social Role Understanding, 4 Developmen-
tal Rev. 192 (1984) (discussing "a systematic sequence of role understanding in
children from one to thirteen years of age"); Fischer & Hand et al., supra note 37; see
also Malcolm W. Watson & Kurt W. Fischer, Structural Changes in Children's Under-
standing of Family Roles and Divorce, in The Development and Meaning of Psycho-
logical Distance (R.R. Cocking & A. Renninger eds., forthcoming 1996) (reviewing
children's developing ability to comprehend family roles) (draft on file with the Ford-
ham Law Review).
161. Watson, supra note 160, at 200-201.
162. Id. at 205; Watson & Fischer, supra note 160, at 9-10; Fischer & Hand et al.,
supra note 37, at 40.
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roles in relational or purposive terms, and they have difficulty com-
prehending that a single person can fill several roles in relation to dif-
ferent people (my father is also a husband to my mother and a doctor
to his patients).163 Between the ages of four and eight, however, chil-
dren gradually acquire the ability to comprehend roles in terms of
their purposes and their relationships (doctors help patients when
they are sick). 64 It is during these years that children also begin to
"de-center," or acquire the ability to adopt another's viewpoint, a skill
needed to comprehend the roles of others.' 65 While they will not ap-
preciate some of the more abstract details of these roles for years to
come, 166 most seven- or eight-year-olds are able to understand the
professional roles with which they are familiar in relevant, if concrete,
terms.167
It is worth noting the distinction between the ability to understand,
on the one hand, and the process of becoming familiar, on the other,
as I am using them in the context of assessing children's role compre-
hension. Whereas the ability to understand is a developmental con-
cept, the process of "becoming familiar" is an educational concept.
Before children develop a certain cognitive capacity, they cannot un-
derstand professional roles in terms that are meaningful to my discus-
sion, regardless of their education or experience. 68 Conversely, until
children have an opportunity to learn about professional roles through
some combination of instruction, observation, and experience, they
163. Watson, supra note 160, at 195.
164. Id. at 200-207; Watson & Fischer, supra note 160, at 10-11; Fischer & Hand,
supra note 37, at 41-43, 59-63.
165. See Piaget & Inhelder, supra note 18, at 95; Robert L. Selman, The Growth of
Interpersonal Understanding: Developmental and Clinical Analyses 38 (1980) (con-
cluding that children gain the ability to see others as unique psychological beings with
different thoughts and feelings between the ages of five and nine); Watson & Fischer,
supra note 160, at 6-7 (describing the interrelationship between the ability to create
psychological "distance" between self and others and the ability to comprehend
roles); cf Dorothy Flapan, Children's Understanding of Social Interaction 65 (1968)
(reporting the results of her study of children's understanding of social interaction at
ages six, nine, and twelve, which suggested that the greatest changes in children's
ability to perceive the thinking and motivation of others occurred between the ages of
six and nine).
166. See Watson, supra note 160, at 201.
167. For purposes of my discussion, the particular age at which children can com-
prehend professional roles is much less important (and much less within my expertise)
than the recognition that, at some relatively young age, children acquire this capacity.
My analysis is tied, not to a particular age, but to the presence or absence of the
capacity for role understanding, whenever it occurs.
168. While there is considerable disagreement among developmental psychologists
about the extent to which instruction may affect the rate at which children achieve
cognitive capacity, see David Wood, How Children Think and Learn 24, 54 (1988)
(comparing Piaget, who minimizes the role of instruction, to Vygotsky, who recog-
nizes a central role for instruction in the stimulation of children's cognitive develop-
ment), this disagreement does not unseat capacity as a necessary precursor of
comprehension, but rather suggests that there is some (though certainly not unlim-
ited) fluidity in how and when that capacity is achieved.
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will not achieve a meaningful understanding of these roles, regardless
of their cognitive capacity. In order for a child to achieve a true un-
derstanding of the lawyer-child relationship, the child must have both
the capacity to understand the lawyer's role, and a familiarity with
that role.169 While only the child can supply the capacity, it is up to
the lawyer to ensure that the role is familiar to the child.170
C. The Narrowness of the Incapacity Exception
Where the child lacks the developmental capacity to understand his
lawyer's role at any level, the lawyer is freed from her obligation to
communicate that role, for such communication is, by definition, not
"reasonably possible." And where the role cannot be communicated,
it is probably inappropriate for the lawyer to assume the traditional
attorney role, for the child who cannot understand his lawyer's role
(or his own role in the relationship) will never be in a position truly to
direct the representation. 17 1 The permissible exception to the lawyer's
duty to explain her role is therefore a narrow one: It only applies to
lawyers serving as GAL's in their representation of very young
children.
Where, on the other hand, the child has the capacity to understand
his lawyer's role, 172 the lawyer's ethical obligation to facilitate that
understanding (to "familiarize" the child with the lawyer's role) comes
into play. For lawyers assuming the traditional attorney role or the
GAL role as a modified client-lawyer relationship, communicating the
lawyer role becomes a "reasonably possible" aspect of the normal cli-
ent-lawyer relationship. Where the GAL role is viewed as a relation-
ship with a nonclient, the child's developmental capacity to
understand the lawyer's role suggests that there is no justification for
departing from the lawyer's ordinary obligation to explain her role to
nonclients. In sum, at least by the time a child is seven or eight years
old (and even, to a lesser extent, wien children are considerably
younger), the failure of children to understand their lawyers' role
probably cannot be accounted for in developmental terms, and there-
fore cannot be excused as a matter of ethics.
169. See Watson & Fischer, supra note 160, at 12-13 (noting that children's per-
formance in the area of role understanding varies widely, depending upon whether
they are provided with a "supportive context"); Fischer & Hand, supra note 37, at 53,
66 (same).
170. This obligation may also fall to others interested in the lawyer-child relation-
ship in the court process. The obligations of other parties and institutions to familiar-
ize a child with his lawyer's role exceeds the scope of this Article.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 75-77.
172. As the preceding discussion about children's development suggests, children's
ability to understand roles will become increasingly sophisticated over time. It is my
contention that the lawyer has an obligation to communicate her role to all children
who can comprehend the role at some level, even a rudimentary level. As the child's
ability to understand the role increases in sophistication, so, too must the lawyer's
communication of the role.
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V. COMMUNICATING THE LAWYER'S ROLE TO THE CHILD
In order to meet their ethical obligation to the vast majority of the
children they represent, lawyers (and the system that supports them)
must develop a means of familiarizing children with their roles, even
where conscientious explanations have failed. In addressing how this
might be accomplished, I begin with a brief review of some of the
relevant developmental and educational literature, particularly the
thinking of three prominent developmental psychologists: Jean
Piaget, Jerome Bruner, and Lev Vygotsky.
A. Lessons from Developmental Psychology and Learning Theory
Jean Piaget, to whom all heads turn in discussions of children's cog-
nitive development, focused on the importance of children's activity,
and thereby experience of the world, for any real intellectual ad-
vances.173 Cognitive development, according to Piaget, is spurred
when children encounter new information, or observe new events,
that do not fit neatly with what they already know and understand.
Children respond to these experiences of "disequilibrium" by some
combination of "assimilation," (that is, adapting what they perceive to
fit what they already know) and "accommodation" (adapting what
they know to account for what they perceive). 174 Without interaction
in the world giving rise to accommodation, significant cognitive devel-
opment cannot occur.' 75
In applying Piaget's conclusions to the classroom, educational theo-
rists encourage teachers to minimize formal instruction and to facili-
tate student's independent play and exploration to allow them to
encounter, and adapt to, experiences of disequilibrium. Indeed, in the
view of these "discovery learning" theorists, teachers who claim to
"teach" children, particularly young children, through verbal instruc-
tion are not teaching concepts. Rather, they are merely teaching pro-
cedures that children can follow, but which have no meaning to
them.' 76
173. Jean Piaget, Piaget's Theory, in 1 Handbook of Child Psychology: History,
Theory and Methods 117-23 (P.H. Mussen & W. Kessen eds., 1983) [hereinafter
Piaget's Theory]; see also Wood, supra note 168, at 5, 19 (summarizing Piaget's em-
phasis on propelling cognitive development through activity); Kathy Sylva & Ingrid
Lunt, Child Development, A First Course 185 (1982) (same).
174. Piaget's Theory, supra note 173, at 107; see also Wood, supra note 168, at 38-41
(describing Piaget's concepts of assimilation, accommodation, and equilibration);
Sylva & Lunt, supra note 173, at 110-11 (same).
175. Piaget's Theory, supra note 173, at 106-09; see also Wood, supra note 168, at 39
(noting that, under Piaget's theory, "some accommodations require dramatic changes
in the structure of the child's understanding of the world"); Sylva & Lunt, supra note
173, at 110-11 (noting that accommodation, unlike assimilation, requires a mental
change in the child to solve problems that are otherwise too difficult for the child to
solve).
176. Wood, supra note 168, at 24; see also Sylva & Lunt, supra note 173, at 184-85.
In their summary of discovery learning, Sylva and Lunt explain:
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Jerome Bruner departs from Piaget in his willingness to recognize a
greater role for instruction in learning, but, like Piaget, he continues
to emphasize the origin of learning in interaction. Bruner divides ef-
fective learning into three phases: the enactive (learning through ac-
tivity), the iconic (learning through pictorial representations), and the
symbolic (learning through language).' 77 While Bruner notes that
children generally progress through these phases and become increas-
ingly able to learn through language (symbolic learning) as they
grow,178 he suggests that instruction in all areas should be sequen-
tial-moving from the concrete to the abstract, from the hands-on to
the purely cerebral. 179 Educators applying his analysis contend that
the teaching of all new subjects should progress through Bruner's
three phases and that teachers encountering difficulties communicat-
ing concepts to students verbally should bring the learning back to a
more interactive level.180
Lev Vygotsky, too, emphasized the importance of interaction for
learning, but he focused on a very different form of interaction. For
Vygotsky, it is children's interaction with their social world, with their
culture, that forms the basis of their cognitive development. l'8 By in-
teracting with their adult role models (and through the active collabo-
ration of these adults) children acquire social knowledge, which is
ultimately converted to individual knowledge about the skills, facts,
Discovery learning is really opposed to the idea of teaching if by teaching
is meant the traditional process of imparting information, or modifying be-
havior, or even filling up an empty vessel with knowledge. The idea is rather
to provide the materials and the environment for the child to explore and let
him do the rest almost by himself, motivated to learn by his own curiosity.
[The child] is involved in an active construction and reconstruction of his
world view and his understanding of what goes on around him.
Id.
177. Jerome S. Bruner, Toward a Theory of Instruction 11, 44-45 (1966).
178. Id. at 12-14.
179. Id. at 21, 29-30, 49.
180. See Educational Psychology 128 (N.L. Gage & David C. Berliner eds., 4th ed.
1988).
181. See generally Lev S. Vygotsky, Mina in Society: The Development of Higher
Psychological Processes (1978); Lev S. Vygotsky, Thought and Language (1986); see
also Wood, supra note 168, at 25 (noting that, according to Vygotsky, "only through
interaction with the living representatives of culture... can a child come to acquire,
embody, and further develop [a society's] knowledge").
While Vygotsky's works were originally published in Russian in the early 20th Cen-
tury, they received little attention from Western psychologists until recent years. See
Wood, supra note 168, at 9. Today, Vygotsky's focus on the social and cultural con-
text of learning is widely embraced. For a leading example of a contemporary devel-
opmental psychologist who has built upon Vygotsky's themes, see the writings of
Barbara Rogoff, including Apprenticeship in Thinking: Cognitive Development in
Social Context (1990) (stressing the importance of both guidance and participation in
the process of cognitive development).
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concepts, and attitudes that are relevant to their particular culture.'82
Vygotsky's work helped focus educators on the social context of
learning, 8 3 and the active collaborative role played by adults in fur-
thering children's intellectual development. In Vygotsky's terms, the
job of a teacher is to identify the "zone of proximal develop-
ment"'sa-the gap between what children can do and know on their
own, and what they can do and know with the help of an adult-and
to engage in cooperative activity and instruction within that zone. 8 5
While the theories of Piaget, Bruner, and Vygotsky differ signifi-
cantly, they share a common focus on the importance of experience
and interaction to the learning process.' 6 As all three theories sug-
gest, talking at children, particularly about matters divorced from
their experience, is unlikely to advance children's understanding.
Developmental and educational theories addressing broad ques-
tions about the sources of children's intellectual growth do not trans-
late neatly into directions about how to teach a child about his
lawyer's role. They do, however, offer some powerful advice to- law-
yers: For children truly to understand what it means to have a lawyer,
and what that lawyer does, they need to experience the process, as
participants and as observers.
Lawyers cannot expect to convey their role effectively to most chil-
dren by simply explaining things more clearly. 8 7 Children have no
182. Vygotsky, Mind in Society, supra note 181, at 56-57; see also Wood, supra note
168, at 19 (noting that Vygotsky theorized that "activity in... the external social
plane is gradually 'internalized' by the child").
183. To recognize that learning occurs within a context is to recognize that learning
is shaped by that context-that learning is context-specific. See Kurt W. Fischer et al.,
The Development of Abstractions in Adolescence and Adulthood, in Beyond Formal
Operations: Late Adolescent and Adult Cognitive Development 45-46 (1984) (noting
that "people always acquire specific skills tied to particular environmental circum-
stances" and that "context always plays an enormous role in developing behavior").
Without the contextual supports of experience and assistance, among other things,
children's behavior is likely to be developmentally compromised. See Fischer & Hand
et al., supra note 37, at 52-53 ("Changes in the amount of [contextual] support typi-
cally produce profound differences in the developmental level of behavior.").
184. Vygotsky, Mind in Society, supra note 181, at 84-91.
185. See Educational Psychology, supra note 180, at 126, 128. Rogoff, supra note
181, emphasizes the child's active, participatory role in this collaborative process of
instruction which she characterizes as "apprenticeship."
186. See Wood, supra note 168, at 8, 19. Even the promoters of "programmed
learning," whose emphasis on an externally controlled, highly structured learning pro-
cess distinguishes them sharply from the psychologists discussed above, stress the
need for active child involvement, and immediate experiential reinforcement of the
concepts learned. While the programmed learning approach, inspired by the beha-
viorist B.F. Skinner, features learning propelled by preprogrammed external stimuli,
its proponents reject learning through passive listening and suggest a student must be
actively engaged in incremental problem-solving in order to learn. See Sylva & Lunt,
supra note 173, at 191.
187. See Perry & Teply, supra note 9, at 1382-83 (noting the difficulty children have
in understanding lawyers' verbal explanations and calling for the use of visual aids
whenever practical).
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context, no relevant experience to make these explanations make
sense. Indeed, attempts to create a context by description are more
likely to mislead than illuminate, for they must rely on inapt compari-
sons (who is a lawyer like?), or confounding elaborations on the un-
predictable and chaotic goings-on of juvenile or family court. In
Piagetian terms, children are likely to respond to these perplexing ex-
planations by assimilating what they hear to fit the world they already
know (again, a world that knows no lawyers). Unless a child sees his
lawyer in action and has an opportunity to engage in the process of
representation as it occurs, he will lack the expertise to make the cog-
nitive accommodation necessary to perceive the lawyer's role for the
unique role that it is.
B. Engaging Children in the Process
The core of the lawyer's representation occurs, of course, in and
around the courtroom. This setting represents the single best place,
therefore, for a child to experience his lawyer's representation. Only
in the courtroom can the child observe the constellation of partici-
pants, the decision-making process, and the role his lawyer plays in
that process. And only in the halls outside the courtroom can the
child observe the negotiation process that is often more key than any
hearing in determining his fate. The value of coming to court to a
child's understanding of his lawyer's role is great regardless of which
model the lawyer assumes.
For the child being represented by the traditional attorney, nothing
so overcomes the child's incredulity as seeing his lawyer in action. It
is one thing for a lawyer to tell a child, at his school or in his living
room, that she will go to court and tell the judge what the child wants
(maybe she will, maybe she won't, and what difference, the child may
wonder, does it make, anyway?). It is quite another matter for the
child to sit in court and hear the lawyer press for what he told her he
wants, do battle with opposing viewpoints before the judge, and even,
perhaps, persuade the judge, against the recommendations of other
parties, that what the child wants should happen. The live demonstra-
tion can also provide a proving ground for promises of client confiden-
tiality, where the particular issues being pressed in the proceeding
bring the lawyer's silence on the subject into sharp relief for the child.
Seeing his lawyer in action will also help the child represented by
the GAL to understand that role. Unlike the client of the traditional
attorney, who needs to be convinced that his lawyer will really advo-
cate what he wants and keep his secrets, the child represented by the
GAL needs to be reminded that his lawyer will not necessarily advo-
cate what he wants and may share his secrets with the court and other
parties. By observing the GAL in court, general statements about
"doing what is best for the child" take on concreteness (both in con-
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tent and context) that distinguishes the GAL's role from that of other
helping adults.
As important for the child's education about the lawyer's role are
his observations of the hallway negotiations that precede the hearing.
In many cases, the bulk of decision making occurs in these informal
negotiations. 8 8 By observing these negotiations, children can learn,
in addition to the kinds of information they can gain in thecourtroom,
a great deal about how their lawyers interact with other adults in-
volved in the case, including parents, care givers, agency social work-
ers, and the lawyers for the various parties. These relationships, and
particularly the content of the lawyers' conversations within these re-
lationships, will tell children a great deal about their lawyers' role.
A child's presence in court not only allows the child to observe his
lawyer's role, but it also puts pressure on the lawyer to be true to her
role. Away from the watchful eye of the client, it is very easy for
traditional attorneys, in particular, to modify the child client's position
to one that it is easier for the lawyer to swallow.'i 9 Where, for exam-
ple, the child has expressed a desire to go home, the lawyer may rep-
resent the child's position to the court (if the child is absent) as a
desire to go home "as soon as appropriate," or "as soon as his mother
completes drug treatment," even if such qualifications were never pro-
vided by the child. Indeed, in her discussion with her client outside of
court, the lawyer may find it just as easy not to press for specifics
when the child states he wants to go home, to try to buy some flexibil-
ity in the child's position when she later goes to court. If the child is
sitting in the courtroom, however, the traditional attorney is under
considerable, appropriate pressure to discover and remain faithful to
the core of the child's position. The lawyer is much more likely to
know, for example, that the child emphatically wants to go home that
very day, regardless of his mother's condition, and much more likely
to convey that position, without qualification, to the court.
In addition to offering an opportunity for first-hand observation,
bringing children to court creates an opportunity for participation that
cannot be duplicated outside the court setting. By attending court,
children have an opportunity to meet with their lawyers at a time
when the issues to be resolved among the parties or by the court are
most sharply presented. In this context, children can develop and ex-
press their positions with the benefit of good information about the
positions of other parties, which are frequently not articulated until
188. See William Wesley Patton & Sara Latz, Severing Hansel from Gretek An
Analysis of Siblings' Association Rights, 48 U. Miami L. Rev. 745, 795 (1994) (noting
that most dependency cases are resolved informally).
189. In their study of lawyers for children in Connecticut, Kim Landsman and
Martha Minow found that lawyers frequently took on responsibilities inconsistent
with their own characterizations of their roles. Landsman & Minow, supra note 6, at
1145-46.
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the day of the court hearing. They can hear their lawyers' assessment
of the strength of the various arguments to be presented and the sup-
port that will be marshaled on their behalf. With a decision imminent,
children discuss their views with an awareness that the positions they
take, and what they say to support those positions, may have a direct
effect on the outcome of the process. For the child represented by the
traditional attorney, the persuasiveness of his positions translates into
his lawyer's more persuasive arguments in negotiations or before the
court. For the child represented by the GAL, the persuasiveness of
his positions will determine whether or not the GAL pursues his
objectives at all. Either way, the process of discussing options and
viewpoints in the context of immediate representation leads to a
clearer sense of the role relationships for the child, and, consequently,
a better opportunity for the child to modify his own involvement in
the relationship to reflect that clearer understanding.
Having represented children under the traditional attorney model
in two jurisdictions, one where the children almost always come to
court, and one where they generally do not, I have seen a significant
difference in children's comprehension of my role, and, consequently,
their willingness and ability to relate to me as a lawyer. In the first
jurisdiction (where children generally attend court), I carried far too
heavy a caseload (more than 400 clients per year), and therefore saw
my clients almost exclusively on the days of their hearings, and only in
court. In contrast, I now represent a small number of clients who I
can see several times each year, in what are considered more natural
and comfortable settings for children, such as schools, homes, and res-
taurants. These clients rarely come to court, in large part because the
expectations of court personnel, judges, potential transporters, and
the children themselves are all against their coming. While I see my
clients more often now, with the obvious advantages for developing a
relationship and providing thorough and competent representation,
my sense is that my clients now tend to be more confused about my
role than my previous clients who saw me less often, and only in the
context of the court process. Like the teachers whom they saw only
when they were being taught, and the doctors whom they saw only
when they were receiving medical care, my previous clients saw me
only in the process of representing them, where that representation
was easiest to perceive.
As a result of their clearer perception, the quality of my conversa-
tions with my clients was much better. We tended to speak for a
longer time, and our discussions were more consistently focused on
the issues at hand. I was able to provide much more specific informa-
tion about the positions of the other parties, as they would be articu-
lated to the court. Our conversations could also be much more
strategic because they occurred in court on the day of the hearing. We
were able to discuss the comparative strength of tactical options, as
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well as substantive positions, because of the relative clarity of others'
positions and tactics, and because of the immediacy of the process.
Overall, clients' better understanding of my role produced better con-
versations and, in turn, those better conversations reinforced my cli-
ents' understanding of my role.
Immediately following these conversations, my clients would watch
me in hallway negotiations and in court. I could involve them in the
negotiations as they progressed, and consult with them again as posi-
tions shifted, or new information was elicited. In court, they could
watch me say what I said I was going to say (and not say what I said I
would not) to the judge, and I could, again, ask for an additional op-
portunity to consult with them if unanticipated issues arose. At the
end of the hearings, I could ask the judge to explain her rulings to my
clients.
Children's presence in court also allowed me to speak to them im-
mediately after the proceeding, to discuss their impressions and to an-
swer their questions. It allowed me to help them anticipate the next
steps in my representation (which, again, reinforced their understand-
ing of what I did). Moreover, children's presence in court had a carry-
over value to our out-of-court discussions, on those rare occasions
when those discussions could occur. Once the judge had a face, and
the issues and process had been brought to life, my client-lawyer com-
munications in other contexts were enhanced.
There is considerable disagreement about the advisability of bring-
ing children to court. 190 Most of the concern focuses on the potential
harm to children, although there is also administrative resistance
among child welfare agencies to the prospect of being responsible for
the burdensome and time-consuming process of bringing children to
court and taking them home afterwards. The fear for children is that
they will be traumatized by the place and by the process. At court,
children are forced to come face-to-face with their history of abuse or
neglect and with the deep family tensions invoked by the proceeding.
Moreover, children are often called upon to take sides, against one or
both parents.
While coming to court can provoke considerable anxiety in chil-
dren, we fool ourselves if we think that avoiding court protects chil-
dren from those anxieties. Much of the anxiety is created by the
existence of the court process (a process whereby a child's future is
determined by a judge) and the issues underlying the court's involve-
ment (the abuse, neglect, foster care placement, or divorce). Lawyers'
conversations with their clients tend to fan those anxieties, whether or
not the child appears in court, because these conversations inevitably
(if grounded at all) focus on the court process and the decisions the
190. See HHS Study, supra note 5, §§ 5.2.4, 6.2.2.3.
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judge will have to make. Realistically, a child is not shielded from the
court process until the court dismisses his case.
The best argument against bringing children to court is that the pro-
cess they observe is an abysmal and chaotic one. For the most part,
children will not see a decorous or thoughtful adversarial process. 191
They will see long waits in dreary, toyless waiting rooms, followed by
brief hearings, at which hallway agreements are hastily presented.
They will see families herded up to the bar of the court and sworn in
en masse. They will see lawyers trying to out-yell each other to get the
judge's attention, and judges making decisions with little or no refer-
ence to the governing legal standards. They may see their own law-
yers derided for trying to force the court to follow a more formal legal
process, or to articulate a clear legal basis for its rulings. They may
even see the judge taking phone calls, or speaking with court person-
nel, while important evidence or argument is being presented.
Given how these overburdened, underfunded, and undervalued ju-
venile and family court processes tend to function, a good argument
could be made that children's presence in court is at least a waste of
their time, and perhaps affirmatively damaging. Moreover, the chaos
that reigns in most of these courts may undermine children's ability to
perceive with any clarity the role played by their lawyers.
Despite the power of this argument, I nevertheless contend that
children's presence is more helpful than harmful to them for two rea-
sons that closely parallel arguments already made. First, there is a
certain value to children seeing precisely what does happen in court.
An understanding of how the court functions is essential to a child's
understanding of how his lawyer functions in that system, and how the
system makes decisions on his behalf. This point is only a subtle varia-
tion on a primary thesis of this Article: A child's understanding of the
true context of representation is an essential piece of a child's under-
standing of his lawyer's role.
Second, while the workings of the court process guarantee that
coming to court will never be fun for most children, the trauma caused
by observing a poorly run court process pales in, comparison to the
trauma caused by children's involvement in the child welfare system,
generally, and the trauma caused by the circumstances leading up to
the system's involvement. Like the concern about the trauma caused
to children by their exposure to the substance of the case at court, the
concern for the trauma caused by children's exposure to the court pro-
191. There are, of course, some well-run juvenile and family courts. My observa-
tion, and the information I have gathered from children's lawyers working in other
jurisdictions, suggest that these well-run proceedings represent the exception rather
than the rule. The particular problems I describe in this paragraph are all problems I
have observed directly. The problems most jurisdictions have in conducting appropri-
ate hearings in these cases are caused, in part, but not in whole, by the lack of re-
sources provided to family and juvenile courts.
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cess underestimates children's awareness of the process, and thereby
overestimates the effect of seeing that process firsthand. Bringing
children to court clearly has the benefit of enhancing their perception
of, and participation in, a relationship with their legal representative.
Against that, the speculative harm caused to children through their
exposure to additional deficiencies in a system they already view as
deficient is not, in my view, weighty enough to tip the scales against
children's attendance.
Although bringing a child to court is surely not the only means, nor
a perfect means, of educating him about his lawyer's role, it is one of
the best means that seems readily achievable, and likely to at least
help produce the desired ends. The same arguments can be made, to
a large extent, about children's attendance at other decision-making
events, such as case plan meetings, though the geater informality of
these proceedings, and the lesser authority of the decision-making
process, can make them less powerful teaching tools than the court
proceedings themselves. The value of interactive learning can also
probably be captured through modeling and role-playing exercises. 9 '
Ultimately, we will need the assistance of those with greater expertise
in how children learn to develop an effective curriculum to teach chil-
dren what lawyers are doing on their behalf. Until such a curriculum
is developed, however, there is no substitute for bringing children into
the process and letting them experience it for themselves.
CONCLUSION
My thinking in this Article, which draws so heavily on my experi-
ence and observation, needs to be tested. In particular, it would be
fruitful for lawyers, psychologists, and educators to combine resources
to study the nature and extent of the problem of children's role mis-
perceptions, and to consider the most effective means of clarifying
lawyers' roles for children. To get a clear sense of the problem and its
solutions would require a thorough examination, in cognitive as well
as experiential terms, of how and when children come to understand
roles, and to what extent the nature of the role in question effects
children's mastery of role comprehension. A thorough examination
of the issue also requires us to speak to children of all ages about their
understanding of their lawyers' roles and how they derived those
understandings.
A child's understanding of who his lawyer is, and what she is doing,
is central to any coherent and fair system of representation for chil-
dren. Establishing the scope of the problems and solutions should,
192. Cf. Kathleen G. Williams, The Philadelphia Court School Project Training Ma-
nuel (1990) (describing a program of discussion, role playing, and touring the court
used by the Philadelphia District Attorney's office to familiarize children with the
court process in preparation for children's testimony at criminal child abuse proceed-
ings) (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
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therefore, be a central inquiry of attorneys seeking to serve their child
clients ethically. As is so often true in the representation of children,
children's powerlessness to complain-to file a malpractice or discipli-
nary action, or to take the matter up with the mayor-leaves enforce-
ment of the child's lawyer's obligation to communicate her role
entirely in the lawyer's own hands. Unless we confront our failure to
communicate our roles to the children we represent and work to over-
come this failure, we lawyers for children will continue to "assume"
meaningless roles, and children will remain in the dark.
